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INTRODUCTION: NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

In Boomer v. Muir,1 a subcontractor on a hydroelectric project
continued to provide goods and services even though the value of the
performance far exceeded the contract price. The general contractor,
who was receiving these goods and services, breached the contract
even though he was paying less than market price for them.2
In many states, a supplier in the subcontractor's position has
among her options the choice of "rescission and restitution." 3 That
means the supplier may rescind the contract and seek, under the label
of "restitution", payment set at market price (or at her cost)4 for all
the nonreturnable goods and services provided over the course of the
project. Under the majority rule, it does not matter whether the market price (or cost) is above the contract price5 or even above the value
of what the defendant has received;6 if after the other party's material
1. 24 P.2d 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
2. It at 578.
3. See, eg., United States v. Zara Contracting, Inc., 146 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 1944); Paul
Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light, 380 F. Supp. 298, 338 (E.D. Ark. 1974); MurdockBryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 703 P.2d 1206, 1217 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Majestic Tile Co. v.
Nicholls, 29 N.Y.S. 551,557 (1936); Allen, Heaton & McDonald v. Castle Farm Amusement Co.,
86 N.E.2d 782, 783 (Ohio 1949); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CoNTRAcrs § 373 cmt. d (1981).
4. On this measure, see infra Part VI.E.
5. See, eg., City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 79 A. 703 (1911) (holding that restitutionary
recovery is not limited by the contract price).
6. See, e.g., Acme Process Equip. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 509 (Ct. C1. 1965); United
States ex rel Susi Contracting Co. v. Zara Contracting Co., 146 F.2d 606, 610-11 (2d Cir. 1944);
RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF CoNTRAS § 347 cmt. c (1932).
The logic of calling such a remedy "restitutionary" has been questioned, on the apparent
ground that restitution should always be measured by the benefit to the defendant. See, e.g.,
Mark Petit, Jr., PrivateAdvantage and Public Power: Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance
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breach the partially-performing supplier chooses to rescind, the court
will award her the price (or cost) of what she has supplied.7 This was
in fact the rule applied in the Muir case.
Andrew Kull strongly takes issue with this majority approach.,
He argues that if contracting parties cannot be returned to their precontract, status quo positions, restitution should be denied. In his
view, restitution should be available only under the limited circumstances where it was permitted under the old common law rules;
under those rules, the contract price would effectively cap any re stitutionary award.' Professor Kull believes that when restitution requires
the defendant to pay an amount in excess of the contract price, the
result is economically unsound as well as unjust.
In particular, Professor Kull fears that the majority ruleallowing full restitutionary awards to a plaintiff who has provided an
extensive amount of nonreturnable goods or services at less than market prices-would have the following effects. He argues it would (1)
Interests in ContractDamages,38 HASTINGS L. 417 (1987). For our response, see the discussion

infra part VIII.
7. The same appears to be true in cases of mutual mistake, where neither party is at fault.
Thus, in Vickery v. Ritchie, the building owner and the contractor were each deceived by a third.
party; the owner signed a contract that stated the price to be $10,000 less than the price contained in the contract signed by the contractor. 88 N.E. 835 (Mass. 1909). Even in such a case,
the court did not think that "the right" of the plaintiff should "depend in any degree upon the
profit or loss to the owner." Id. at 837, The plaintiff was awarded the "fair value of his labor and
materials," id., despite a finding that this exceeded the increase in the value of the owner's real
estate, id. at 837. (We are indebted to Paul Shupack here.).
8. Andrew Kull, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract,67 S. CAL L. Rev. 1465
(1994). For others who have argued that the contract price should cap a restitution award, see,
e.g., Henry Mather, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract: The Case of the Partially
PerformingSeller, 92 YALE LJ. 14, 48 (1982); Palmer, The ContractPriceAs a Limit on Restitution for Defendant'sBreach, 20 OHIO ST. LJ. 264 (1959); Joseph Perillo, Restitution in the Second
Restatement of Contracts,81 COLUM. L. REv. 37, 42 (1981).
Professor Kull's position has much in common with that of Douglas Laycock. See DouoLAs
LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIEs" CASES AND MATERIALS (1985) and the accompanying TEAcHmRs' GuIDE. (Note that we have Professor Laycock's permission to quote from the
Teachers' Guide.).
9. In Professor Kull's view, rescission and restitution should be limited along the lines
indicated by a much earlier stage of the common law. Kull, supra note 8, at 1468, 1513-16.
Professor Kull does not insist on exact adherence to the terms of the old common law. Id. at
1513-16. He argues that the remedy should be available only when (speaking approximately), it
largely appears that (1) defendant's behavior is "tantamount to a repudiation," id. at 1514-15; (2)
plaintiff has not yet invested a significant amount in performance, id at 1516; and (3) the goods
are returnable in specie, or the transaction can be otherwise fully undone, id. at 1515-16.
In such cases, restitution is highly unlikely to result in a monetary award in excess of the
contract price.
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create inefficient incentives for the parties by (a) encouraging the supplier to maneuver the other party into a breach 10 and (b) encouraging
that other party to overspend in order to avoid breach-like behavior.'
He also argues that it would (2) engage courts in the potentially
expensive administrative task of going outside the four comers of the
contract to value the plaintiff's performance. 12 Professor Kull further
argues that such awards in excess of the contract price (3) do not represent a plausible default rule to which the parties themselves would
have agreed ex ante.13 Additionally, he contends that such awards are
(4) unjustified by the law of restitution itself because the defendant
purchaser is not unjustly enriched if he is required to pay the contract
price for what he has received.' 4
11. SUMMARY OF OUR PROPOSAL
Professor Kull's article provides a wonderful education in the law,
history, morality, and economics of certain contract problems. It is
well thought out and stimulating.
However, underlying Professor Kull's argument is the assumption
that because of the substantial difference between the contract price
and the market price of the goods and services supplied (or the difference between their contract price and their cost to the supplier), the
contracts he discusses are "losing contracts." Viewed as spot, shortterm contracts and measured by the money only, such contracts may
indeed be losing contracts; if so, the consequences that Professor Kull
predicts in terms of the effect of a restitutionary rule on the parties'
incentives and behavior may well be realistic. In contrast, we propose
what we believe to be a more plausible assumption, that many ostensibly losing contracts are in fact beneficial to both parties; then we
explore what implications would follow from this assumption and propose a different rule.
A. BEYOND THE FAcE OF THE CoNTRAcT
A pricing shortfall on the face of a contract does not mean the
supplier has a losing position; parties often do not price contracts
solely by reference to the short-term and monetizable advantages they
10. Id. at 1502.
11. Id.at 1501-02.

12. 1d at 1501.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1483-84.
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provide.'" For example, we will suggest (plausibly, we think) that the
subcontractor in the Boomer v. Muir case did not calculate his compensation at little more than half of its market value by some horrendous mistake. 6 Business people are generally more rational and wellinformed. Those who make such mistakes do not stay in business
long.
Undertaking to perform and performing a contract at less than
market price or less than cost does not necessarily mean that a supplier is mistaken, ignorant, mad, or self-sacrificing. Nor does continuing to perform a contract on such terms necessarily mean that the
supplier is acting merely to avoid an action for breach of contract by
the other party. It may be more likely that she affirmatively desires to
complete the contract. Her behavior may indicate that something else
compensates her for the underpriced performance. Similarly, when
the defendant misbehaves and instead of suing, the supplier-plaintiff
continues to perform despite the fact that her costs are drastically
increased by the defendant's misconduct, we can plausibly assume she
has some rational motive for doing so. She may fear that she will
herself be sued for breach; but in many contexts it will be more likely
that she expects to receive some intangible benefit, in addition to the
price, from-the completion of the contract. Such a supplier's continuing, below-cost performance may be a way of bribing the other party
to stay in the contract.
B.

SEPARATING OUT THE NON-LOSING CoNTRAcrs: VIRTUES OF A
BIFURCATED APPROACH

Critiques of the majority rule are usually premised on the
assumption that the contracts at issue are "losers" for the supplying
15.

Of course, this is fundamentally an empirical issue. This Comment will suggest possible

scenarios of ostensibly losing contracts that are not true "losers"-and thus possible ways for a
court to structure its factual investigations.
16. In Muir, the court notes that if the plaintiff had completed the contract, he would have
received $20,000. Pursuant to his restitution claim, however, he received a judgment for
$250,000. 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
The facts of the case are somewhat obscure. Professor Laycock suggests that the following
might have been the facts: that "[t]he contract price was $333,000"; that "Boomer had received
$313,000 in progress payments, and would have been entitled to another $20,000 if he finished
the job" and had spent $571,000 "building as much as he did, not counting any waste that was his
own fault" and "it would have cost another $29,000 to finish the job." LAYCOCK, supranote 8, at
523. The larger a disbrepancy, the more likely it resulted from the supplier's deliberate decision
rather than his mistake.
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party;17 we will show that those critiques can do no more than persuade courts to limit their restitutionary awards in cases of truly losing
contracts. Where, by contrast, intangible, non-price benefits are
expected, so that the supplier would not actually lose from contract
completion, we argue that it is desirablefor courts to give suppliers the
option of receiving a restitutionary award even if it exceeds the contract price.
Though our approach might involve courts in separating losing
from non-losing contracts,' 8 our way of handling non-losing contracts
has four sets of virtues. First, it creates incentives for the parties to act
efficiently by (a) discouraging the recipient of the below-cost goods
from exploiting the supplier's desire for contract completion by engaging in opportunistic and wasteful behavior, (b) discouraging the recipient of the below-cost goods from inefficiently breaching the contract,
and perhaps most importantly, (c) encouraging efficient contracts to
form by, inter alia, allowing the parties to take socially-beneficial
advantage of asymmetries in information.
Second, such an award structure may also have desirable implications for administrative costs, giving courts a means by which to indirectly measure opportunity cost, reliance, and expectation. In some
cases this approach will be more reliable and easier to administer than
the usual measures. 19 Third, the restitutionary remedy may accurately
reflect what the parties would have viewed to be in their mutual selfinterest had they focused their attention on the question ex ante.
Fourth, we show that in such contexts, allowing restitutionary awards
in excess of the contract price is justified by the law of restitution
itself.
Where a plaintiff's losses from a contract are ostensible rather
than real, courts that adopt a full restitutionary measure would not be
making the errors Professor Kull depicts. Rather, in such cases the
majority rule simply requires the defendant to give the plaintiff the
best equivalent20 to precisely what the defendant agreed to pay initially: contract price and contract completion.

17. In comparison, see Kull, supra note 8.
18. On this administrative cost issue, see infra Part VIIE.
19. Professor Kull recognizes that courts have sometimes used a restitutionary measure as
a proxy for reliance. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1492.
20. In most cases contracts involve services and goods that are not unique. In these cases
specific performance of the contract is not available. See infra note 51.
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Admittedly, in most contract cases, obtaining the contract price is
a supplier's ostensible end. But in cases like Muir, the courts may be
recognizing that some parties value the means to that end as much as
the end itself.21 Further, this value can be quite visible to even the
most hard-headed Holmesian among us.2
C.

OUR PROPOSED RULE

The reader may find it useful if we summarize the approach we
think should apply. We tentatively suggest the following as a desirable refinement and restatement of the majority rule:
WHERE

(a)

(1)

as part of an ongoing contract a supplier provides
goods or services at a below-market price;

OR

(2)

in entering into a contract a supplier agrees to
provide goods or services at a below-market price;
(b) because the supplier expects that contract completion will
yield non-price benefits sufficient to make that contract
profitable; AND
(c) the recipient of these goods and services accepts them with
the knowledge that they are being provided because the
supplier expects such non-price benefits; AND
(d) the recipient materially breaches the contract;
THEN

(e) the supplier should be given the option to rescind the

contract;
AND

(f)

receive a restitutionary award compensating her for any
nonreturnable goods and services she provided,

(g) at an amount either equal to her costs, or, if the defendant
can prove that market price was lower than the supplier's
costs, at market price.23
21. See Edwin Baker, Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933
(1983).
22. That is, we show that a broad restitution rule is justifiable without needing to rest on
the notion that contracts imply a moral obligation to perform. Regardless of whether one
believes, like Justice Holmes, that performing a contract and paying damages for its breach are
equally appropriate, one can support imposing on a defendant an obligation to pay more than
the contract price. Ordinary expectation and reliance damages can do as much.
23. This rule might be usefully amended to recognize another possible reason for
deliberately providing below-market goods and services, namely, a party's belief that the
contract required her to make such provision. Where that belief is correct and the receiving
party does not breach, then of course the supplier has no relief. However, that belief can be
erroneous. Galligan shows us there can be substantial confusion in the administration of
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The Boomer v. Muir rule (adopted by the majority of the courts)
is actually broader than our proposed rule, for it provides
restitutionary awards-uncapped by the contract price-even in cases
which are truly losing contracts and where other of our conditions are
not satisfied. This breadth has various possible explanations as we
discuss below, 24 including a desire to simplify judicial proceedings and
save administrative costs.
D.

CATEGORIES OF RELIEF

Arguably, we discuss cases that might be resolved by expectationbased or reliance-based compensation. That is because we explain
apparently losing contracts, in which a party provides goods or services substantially below market price or costs, by the parties' expectations for non-price benefits (from existence or completion of the
contracts), or by the parties' reliance on the contract for such benefits.25 In fact, however, the courts are unlikely to award the plaintiffs

in the cases we discuss expectation and reliance compensation because
of the degree of proof which the courts would demand for such nonprice benefits. Some recent cases have granted somewhat speculative
expectation damages, however, and if this new trend continues and
construction contracts, often forcing suppliers to give more than they are legally required to.
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Extra Work in Construction Cases: Restitution,; Relationship, and
Revision, 63 TuL. L. REv. 799, 800 (1989). Where that happens, allowing restitution to the
mistaken party may be proper under another doctrine of unjust enrichment law: that is,
restitution may operate to recover goods or monies that were paid under a mistaken belief that
one was legally obligated to provide them, see; &g., PETER Buts, AN INTRODUCION TO THE
LAW OF REsMrnoN 149-53 (1985) (liability mistakes by plaintiffs) (English law), particularly
when the person receiving the goods or monies is aware of the belief that motivated the transfer.
See id. ch. VIII (free acceptance by defendants); cf. Galligan, supra, at 803 (courts typically
award restitution in construction cases where there has been exploitable ambiguity as to a
performing party's obligations).
This "liability error" approach applies to losing as well as non-losing contracts, and as such
is outside the scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, if we were to restate our proposed rule with
explicit mention of this wrinkle, it would look roughly like this (with the changes italicized):
(a) where in entering or performing a
a supplier provides goods or services
at a below-market price (c) either [i]
in the expectation of receiving non-price benefits
from contract completion, or [ii]
in the erroneous beliefshe is legally requiredto provide
those goods or services, and (d) the recipient of these goods and services accepts them
with
knowledge
thatinthey
motivated
thethen
supplier's
expectations
(asbreaches
in [ii) or by
the supplier's
belief
her are
liability
contract,
(as in by
[ii]),
the supplier
(e)
when
the
recipient
should
the
be entitled
to receive
an award
compensating
her for any
nonreturnable
goods
and
services
she
provided,
can
either
prove market
her costs, or, if the defendant
price would be lower than plaintiff'satcosts,
at market price.
24.
See
part
IX.
25. Thatinfra
is, we will show the benefits that the majority approach
provides in the context of
ostensibly losing, but actually mutually-beneficial, contractual
relationships.
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widens, such expectation damages might subsume many situations in
which courts have granted restitutionary damages in the past.
Nevertheless, if the traditional requirements of certainty and
specification of the scope of risk do not work perfectly in the context
of cases such as those we discuss, the best practical response may not
be to erode contract rules that have great usefulness in the ordinary
context. It may be preferable to embrace a special remedy (restitution) for a special case, As Fuller and Perdue noted long ago, those
situations which unite loss to plaintiff and gain to defendant have special claim to rectification. 26
E. OuTLEN OF ComtmNT
This Comment is structured as follows. We first survey the possible benefits that might flow from ostensibly losing contracts. 27 We
next discuss fairness to the defendant, particularly whether the award
of restitutionary remedy must depend on whether the defendant had
notice of the plaintiff's expectation of nonmonetary benefits and the
importance of there being an actual contract in addition to a transfer
of benefits to the defendant.29 We then turn to the issue of primary
resource allocation3 ° and compare with our approach a rule that
would cap plaintiff's remedy at the contract price;31 in this regard we
pay particular attention to discouraging both opportunism and inefficient breach and encouraging efficient use of informational asymmetries. We follow this comparison with a discussion of the
administrative costs. 32 Penultimately, we deal with the relationship
between expectation, reliance, and restitutionary damages. We conclude that even though the courts may be expanding expectation damages, they are not yet covering all restitutionary cases under that
26. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages: 1,
46 YALE LJ. 52, 56 (1936) (citing ArIus'OTL, NIcomAcHmAN ETmcs 120-23 (Martin Oswald

trans., 1962)). For a Lockean rationale justifying roughly the same normative claim, see Wendy
J. Gordon, On Owning Information:Intellectual Propertyand the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA.

L. REV. 149, 208-10 (1992).
27. See infra part 1m.
28. See infra part IV.
29. See infra part V.
30. The "primary" or "allocative" cost locution refers to economic impacts out in the
world, as opposed to "administrative" costs. Cf. Gumo CALABREsi, CosTs OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis 21, 27,28 (1970) (opposing primary and secondary real-world

costs with "tertiary" administrative costs).
31. See infra part VI. We recognize that other proposals exist as well, but do not specifically discuss each.
32. See infra part VII.
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rubric33 and that giving restitutionary awards in the Muir context is
consistent with underlying doctrinal patterns and policies.' The issue
of whether restitution should be awarded under an expanded rubric of
expectations is left for another day.35
III.

THE INTANGIBLE BENEFITS OF SEEMINGLY LOSING

CONTRACTS
A.

INTANGIBLE BENEFITS IN

EXCHANGE FOR DISCOUNTED PRICE

A large part of Professor Kull's argument against the restitutionary remedy in cases like Muir is that the parties should get "what they
bargained for" and no more.3 6 We agree with the principle. We disagree with its application, however. While Professor Kull considers the
price to be the only thing for which the supplier bargained, we suggest
that Muir and similar decisions reflect that the supplier had factored
into her bargain something more than just the price.
Thus, a contract that promises a supplier lower monetary consideration than the market price is not necessarily a "losing contract." In
fact, it is more likely that such a contract will carry with it nonmonetized expectations. A supplier may value the contractual relationship
for the sake of the benefits (in addition to receipt of the contract
price) that she believes will flow from the existence and completion of
the contract. 37 The following will discuss some of the non-price benefits that might compensate for the monetary discount a supplier may
offer.
1. Benefits from Third Parties: Contract Existence and Completion
A contract relationship may enhance the supplier's reputation. If
so, contract completion38 may provide a supplier of goods or services
an opportunity of gaining future benefits from third parties.
For example, consider an experienced but unknown architect who
leaves her staff position at a large architectural firm to start her own
33. See infra part VIII.
34. See infra part IX.
35. See infra part IX.B.
36. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1478-84.
37. Discussion of that general point will occur in the following sections. See infra part
Im.A.1-II.B.
38. As for skill training, contract completion will be important only in those cases when the
relevant skill is that of completion-for example, the opportunity to take a large building project
through full construction.
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business. Her prior projects probably bear the firm's name rather
than her own. She might well be willing to offer her services at less
than market price in order to establish an independent reputation in
the market by having a building fully credited to her. If the architect
is rational, and we assume that she is, this intangible value will equal
or exceed any difference between the discount price in the contract
and the market price.3 9 That difference, or shortfall, can itself be used
as a minimum measure of the contract's intangible value to the
plaintiff.
2. Benefits from the Other Party: Reciprocity
Alternatively, or in addition, a supplier may offer a discount to
the other party in the hope of receiving future benefits from that other
party. Such expectations generally arise in ongoing relationships and
are based on the strong inclination of people to expect and offer reciprocal treatment. 4 That is why one practice of salesmanship is: be first
to give something to a potential buyer-that person will feel obligated
to reciprocate and buy. A gift or the offer of a price discount can
create moral, psychological, and social pressures to reciprocate.
For example, assume that a buyer of goods and services knows41
that the supplying party is willing to accept an under-market price
now in the expectation of being rehired later. If the buyer nevertheless materially breaches this contract, that may be tantamount to repudiation4 2 of the understanding regarding possible reciprocity in the
future-and entitle the other party to the value of the expected reciprocal benefits.
Thus, it is possible that the subcontractor in the Muir case agreed
to provide or continued to provide services at less than the market
price in order to obtain work from the contractor in the future. 43 The
contractor was engaged in a large project: building a dam at a cost of
39. For example, if she has a 40% expectation of receiving $100,000 in new business from
successful completion of a given building, she may be willing to accept $40,000 less for providing
services toward that building than she might otherwise demand.
40. For a fascinating discussion of the subject, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RE iPRocrry 73,
354, 346-51, 383 (1986) (discussing self esteem; strategy of tit for tat; and family).
41. On the role of notice, see infra Part IV.
42. Compare Kull's discussion of what kind of breach (repudiatory, et cetera) should be
required as prerequisite to plaintiff's obtaining rescission. Kull, supra note 8, at 1495, 1514-15.
43. In Muir,the court does not mention this explanation, instead focusing on the possibility
that the defendant's conduct rendered the plaintiff's performance unprofitable. Boomer v.
Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 578 (Cal. CL App. 1933).
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over $7 million (about $1 billion in today's currency). 4 This would be
the kind of project in which a subcontractor might expect future
assignments. In such a case the subcontractor would not view the contract as a losing one but for a breach by the defendant that makes
clear that future assignments will not be forthcoming.
To be sure, the expectation of reciprocity is not rational in spot,
short-term contracts. Reciprocity is practiced and expected, however,
among parties in long-term relationships, among members of a profession or trade, 45 and among groups that are dependent on each other
for their business, such as specialized subcontractors (electricians,
46
plasterers, and painters) and contractors in the building business.
There are some empirical data to suggest that U.S. businessmen
in some regions will perform their contracts because they value honor
and reputation over money no matter how much they might lose.47
Such evidence may be interpreted to contradict our assumptions, for it
may indicate that far more losing contracts exist than our argument
assumes. That is, conceivably some business persons supply belowcost goods and services out of an erroneous belief they are legally
obligated to do so and not because they expect non-price benefits out
of reciprocity. However, these cases may be amenable to restitution
under another doctrine, namely, benefits conferred under mistake of
law. 48
This evidence, moreover, may strengthen rather than undercut
our argument. Honor may be efficient, 49 and reciprocity (one of the
44. Id. at 571.
45. For example, even though real estate brokers compete for customers they need each
other to efficiently identify potential buyers or sellers beyond their own client base. They often
refer customers to each other in the expectation of reciprocity and rarely fail to reciprocate.
Medical doctors and lawyers act in a similar way.
46. The bargaining position of the parties may change depending on the extent of labor
shortage. Long-term, each group member recognizes the dependence on the good graces of the
other. Even if the business of these actors is national or international, reciprocity in particular
localities must be maintained to reduce the cost of moving personnel and gaining community
acceptance.
47. ROBERT C. EwLClSON, OaDER WrmiouT LAw- How NmmiBoRs STrLE DisrUMs
154,189-90 (1991) (discussing the work of Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 63 (1963)). Businessmen in the midwest
believed that you should stick by your words "in almost all situations." Id.

48. See Bums, supra note 23, at 140-53 (English law).
49. Honor and reputation are valuable in contracts within ongoing relationships because if
everyone adheres to the code of honor the costs of monitoring and enforcement are reduced for
all parties. See ELLCSON, supra note 47, at 189-91.
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forms of non-price benefit) is a form of honor. Reciprocity and keeping one's word "at all costs" may go together.
Thus, a serious error made by one party is likely to lead to an
adjustment either in the particular contract or through future arrangements by reciprocity. Group pressure to perform at any cost is compensated by long-term relationships which enable the parties to adjust
exchange discrepancies, thus suggesting reciprocity will be a norm
among these same-business people.50
In short, in some types of contracts reciprocity may constitute an
intangible, but acknowledged and highly valued benefit. Because in
many of these cases specific performance is not available,-1 a restitutionary remedy is appropriately awarded.
3. Benefits from the ContractPeriod Coverage
Contract duration itself can constitute a non-price benefit for
which the parties bargained. Thus, contract completion can have
value when the contract covers a period over which compensation is
expected to fluctuate, as with a contract to supply seasonal goods or
services. A supplier of seasonal services will often agree to compensation below the market price in high season provided that the contract
extends throughout the low season as well. Such a supplier will typically demand compensation at a price that is close to the weighted
average of both seasons' market prices. In this case it is obvious that
the completion of the contract has for the supplier a special value that
affected her consent to the level of compensation. Therefore, if the
other party breaches the contract at the point when high seasonal
prices begin to drop, the supplier should be entitled to compensation
for what she has already supplied-and not just at the contract price,
50. Though we know of no research explicitly examining whether the "stick by your word"
norm and the "reciprocity" norm are likely to appear together, the fact that both are likely
components of "honor" suggest that they do. Reciprocity is at least as common a norm as is the
other. Cf.id. at 154 (reciprocity is "'a norm that is one of the world's commonest!" (quoting
GEORGE C. HoMANs, THE HuMAN GROUP 284 (1950))).

51. With few unique exceptions, courts deny specific performance of service contracts and
refuse to impose a duty to perform on the party that undertook to provide the service. See E.
AL.LAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAS § 12.4 (2d.ed. 1990). For reasons of equal treatment, courts
will also deny specific performance to the other party to the contract. In addition, courts will not
grant specific performance when the costs of monitoring the remedy are high. Id. § 12.7. In the
Boomer v. Muir case, specific performance would require two warring parties to cooperate and
work together and require the court to supervise and maintain the relationship. It is doubtful
whether that relationship could be maintained, and even if it could, the judicial enforcement
costs would probably be high.
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but rather at the higher market rate (or her costs)., 2 Had she known
the contract would last only for the high season, she would have
charged a high-season price.
A similar point can be made about cases in which market-price
fluctuations cannot be predicted in advance. In any case where a supplier continues to provide services at a contract price after the market
prices have risen above that price, and the other party later breaches
the contract when market prices have fallen below the contract price,
the supplier should be entitled to compensation for materials and
services already delivered at the higher market price she would have
received had there been no contract in effect.5 3 Admittedly, in such
cases the supplier may not have expected to be providing goods or
services at a below-market price (distinguishing the supplier from the
provider under a seasonal contract), but she did bargain with the
expectation of accepting risk for the whole contract period. Sans the
54
whole period, the benefits she bargained for will not be forthcoming.
B. NON-PRICE BENEFITS FROM CoNTRAcr COMPLETION
1.

Benefits of Contract Completion

Intangible benefits can explain not only why a supplier agrees to
a discounted contract price but also why a supplier, who enters a contract at the full price, continues to perform the contract at a loss
caused by the breach of the other party, rather than repudiate the
contract. For example, in the Muir case, the contractor breached the
express terms of the contract from day one, failing to transfer control
over the necessary power equipment to the subcontractor and failing
to provide the materials that the subcontractor needed in order to perform the work.55 The jury also found that, notwithstanding these
breaches, the subcontractor did not leave the work, but continued to
make both himself and his crew available; at the same time he protested the contractor's breach of the contract. 56
52. See Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., 48 N.E. 888, 889 (Ohio 1897).
53. See Clark v. Manchester, 51 N.H. 594, 595-96 (1872).
54. Thus, it may not have been only the threat of the other party's suit that encouraged her
to continue her supply activity after the market price rose; she may think that in the long run she
won't be hurt by the short-term shortfall.
55. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 572-73 (Cal. CL App. 1933).
56. Id. at 574.
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Arguably, the plaintiff simply threw good money after bad, performing irrationally or by error. A better explanation is that he continued to perform after the defendant's breach, at excess cost to
himself, because the plaintiff expected such non-price benefits in the
form of future work 7 from the contractor in reciprocity.
The defendant's contract termination eliminated a valuable component of the plaintiff's benefits. To make the plaintiff whole, the
defendant was required to pay the full value of the plaintiff's services-sans the contract relationship and the future expected benefits it
provided. This value can be roughly measured by the difference
between the price the plaintiff was to receive under the contract, and
his performance costs or the market price of the goods and services.
2. Exceptions and Apparent Exceptions
We readily concede that not all discounts are offered with the
expectation of intangible non-price benefits. For example, a supplier
may offer a deep discount because he made an error in pricing. In
such a case, if the other party breaches the contract it would be unjust
to the breaching party to award the supplier more than the contract
price. 8 Such a result would undermine an important policy of
57. During the contract period, the parties renegotiated and adjusted important terms of
the contract: The subcontractor's price was increased, the amounts to be withheld until the completion of his work were paid to him, and the subcontractor agreed to meet periodic targets for
pouring cement. Id. at 572. Although in Professor Kull's story "[tihe general contractor failed to
deliver some item of materials, the subcontractor left the job unfinished, and the parties went to
court, each accusing the other of substantial breach. The jury decided this issue, which could
have gone either way, in favor of the subcontractor." Kull, supra note 8, at 1471. We need not
speculate whether the case could have gone either way. The fact is that the subcontractor wonthe contractor was held to have breached, and the subcontractor was justified in leaving the job
unfinished. Such behavior seems to be based on the value which the subcontractor attributed to
the existence of the contract.
58. Courts have noted that a wide disparity between an offered price and a market price
can indicate a unilateral mistake as to the terms of the agreement of which an offeree should be
aware. See In re Jay's rucking Co., 26 B.R. 73, 76 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982). Alternatively, an
error may be due to a computational or technical error for which it would be inequitable to hold
a party to the stated price. See S.T.S. Transp. Serv. v. Volvo White Truck Corp., 766 F.2d 1089,
1093 (7th Cir. 1984). In either case, the contract may be voidable. REsTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF
CoNTcrAcs §§ 152-54 (1981); see Rushlight Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. City of Portland, 219
P.2d 732 (Ore. 1950). Despite these possibilities, as the disparity grows, the likelihood that a
supplier made an error in judging economic conditions or costs decreases.
A potential counter-example is Aydin Corp. v. United States. There the plaintiff sued the
government after receiving information under the Freedom of Information Act that showed that
its bid was 40% less than the only other bid. The plaintiff sought rescission and restitution under
a quantum valebant theory. The court denied this relief because the plaintiff's error was simply
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encouraging people to collect the necessary information to avoid such
mistakes.
We suspect, however, that if market prices are available during
contract negotiations, a real error is likely to involve a small differential. In such cases the parties will not have much to fight about; they
may settle the difference.
As the difference between the market price and contract price
increases, however, the probability that the supplier made an error
diminishes. The market price offers a strong signal calling for the supplier's attention, and in cases of extreme divergence between market
and contract price, it is far more likely that the supplier expected nonprice benefits from the contract than that she made an error in offering such a low price. We argue that most business people act in a
rational manner and would offer deep discounts only if they expected
other intangible benefits from the contracts.
Against our supposition, it might be argued that some subcontractors offer a deep discount because they could not find a buyer for
their services or goods. In theory, if a supplier agrees to the low price
because he has no choice, and the contractor drove a hard bargain, we
agree that the subcontractor should be awarded the contract price
rather than the higher market price. Yet in such cases, this is likely to
be a distinction without a difference.
If the supplier offered discounted prices because of low demand
for its services or goods, the market price would have reflected this
low demand, and the contract price would have represented no discount at all. Similarly, a supplier may agree to a low contract price
because the quality of the goods or services is low. In such a case the
market price for such low quality offerings will match the contract
price, and there would be no real discount because these two prices
will coincide. Or perhaps, the supplier offered an apparent discount
because of personal deficiencies, such as a bad reputation or a criminal record; in this case, again, the market price for the offering will
coincide with the contract price. Thus, such instances are not counterexamples to our argument.

an error in judgment and not a mistake of which the defendant should have been aware. 669
F.2d 681, 686 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
However, a 40% discrepancy such as that seen in Aydin might be explainable not on the
ground of a conspiracy among the bidders, perhaps suspected by the court but not proved.
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IV. FAIRNESS TO THE DEFENDANT: NOTICE OF
EXPECTED INTANGIBLE BENEFITS
Many cases reflect the concern that compensating the plaintiff for
loss of non-price benefits may be unfair to the other (breaching)
party.5 9 Arguably, that other party may not be aware of the plaintiff's

expectations and hopes for intangible benefits. Because contract parties provide each other with guarantees against risks it is often seen as
wrong to hold a party liable for losses against which it did not~agree to
provide guarantees, particularly losses of uncertain magnitude.
We do not argue with this principle; but it is not the issue here.
The disagreement is about the facts: Is the other party usually unaware of the non-price benefits the supplier expects to receive?
We believe that in many situations involving expected non-price
benefits the other party has, indeed, received express or implied
notice of the expectations; and in these situations restitutionary remedies are appropriate.60
Proof of such notice may reside in explicit statements. Consider a
supplier who says to the other party: "I am offering you my services at
an extraordinarily low price because I hope that if my services are
satisfactory you will recommend me to other customers." Or a supplier who says to the other party: "I will supply you goods and services
at a deep discount because I hope that, if you are satisfied, you will
employ me on your next project."
Or proof may arise out 6f context. There are cases in which the
very circumstances serve as notice of a party's expectations. For
example, construction contracts lend themselves to expectations of
reciprocity. 61 During the performance of these contracts each party
59. Under the rule announced in Hadley v. Baxendale courts limit damages in a contract
action to those damages that are reasonably foreseeable by the breaching party. 156 Eng. Rep.
145 (Ex. 1854); see Paul Hardeman, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light, 380 F. Supp. 298,319 (E.D.
Ark. 1974) (quoting Benedict L Lubell, UnilateralPalpableand ImpalpableMistake in Construc-

tion Contracts,16 MN,,N. L. REv. 137 (1931)).
60. When the expectations of the supplier are not legally binding and enforceable, (where,
for example, the expectations are for future assignments) the other party is not required to
honor these expectations and need not reciprocate. However, the other party must deal with the
supplier in good faith. If it is aware of the expectations, it should not be permitted to take
advantage of the discounted price and then breach the contract in violation of the expectations.
See infra part V.
61. See e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts,67 VA.
L. REv. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical Neoclassical & Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. R-v. 854 (1978).
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may, at some point, give more than it is required to give under the
contract. That party can rationally expect to be rewarded, either during the contract period or later: I will do more than we agreed upon
now, but "you owe me one" (or more).
The Muir case, on which Professor Kull focuses, offers an example of such notice by implication. In that case, the subcontractor/supplier continued to perform at a losing rate caused by the contractor's
misbehavior. The contractor had notice of these additional supplies. 62
The contractor could not have avoided taking notice because the subcontractor complained bitterly about the excess cost and about the
breaches.63 The court could have viewed the express complaints of
the subcontractor and his continued performance at a cost far higher
than the contract price as evidence of notice to the contractor that the
subcontractor expected some intangible benefits from the continuation of the contract. Indeed, Thomas Galligan tells us that in construction contracts it is common for one party to provide more
supplies and services than it has undertaken contractually and that
such excess supplies are usually compensated for by the other party.64
Impliedly, benefits that the contractor receives may also constitute
notice of the subcontractor's expected non-price benefits. In many
cases, it would be irrational for the contractor to view the supply of
additional goods as "free lunch."
When the defendant breaches such a contract he signals that he
will not fulfill the plaintiff's expectations. If the defendant materially
breaches the contract after receiving the benefit of the bargain (or
more) under the contract, the defendant must compensate the plaintiff
not only by the monetized contract terms but also for the failed and
known expectations that depended on the continuation of the
contract.65
62. For cases where the courts awarded special damages even though the special circumstances were communicated to the breaching party after the contract was made, see J.N. Adams,
Hadley v. Baxendale and the Contract/TortDichotomy, 8 ANroo-Am. L. REv. 147 (1979). Liability in these cases might be grounded on intentional tort: the courts' finding that the breaching
party had capacity to perform and made a conscious choice not to perform the contract
Paul Shupack has intringuingly suggested that intentional tort might provide an alternative
explanation or grounding for many cases in which restitution was awarded in excess of contract
price.
63. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 573-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
64. Galligan, supra note 23, at 800,811 (1989) (stating that "[t]he perfectly discrete transaction does not exist").
65. If a contract becomes a losing contract after it has taken effect because of external
circumstances, for example, because prices have changed, the losing party will be bound to the
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V. MERE EXPECTATIONS STANDING ALONE ARE NOT A
BASIS FOR RESTITUTION
We concluded in the prior section that a breaching party should
be liable for the other party's expectations only if the breaching party
had express or implied notice of the expectations. Our rule also
assumes that another condition will be met if the defendant is to be
made liable for expectations that do not independently constitute
legal obligations: A related contract exists among the parties.
A.

EXPECrATIONS THAT Do NOT AMOUNT

TO

LEGAL

OBLIGATIONS

We believe that there is a rich variety of circumstances which fall
between enforceable contracts and nonenforceable social and business
understandings. Even if these understandings could be translated into
binding contractual agreements the costs of'the translation could be
too high because these understandings may be too vague and contingent. More importantly, many contractually binding deals are accompanied by "soft" promises ("I'll do my best, but will not obligate
myself contractually") and acceptance of such promises. For example,
the other party may acknowledge a supplier's expectations involved in
offering goods at a discount but may not be willing to promise the
supplier additional orders for the goods in the future.
No doubt, the courts are aware of these "shadow" understandings
and of their social utility.' Therefore, courts will not enforce these
understandings when the promising party fulfills its contractual obligations; so long as it does not breach the contract, it is not bound to
meet the understandings and "soft" expectations at all,6 and even if it
breaches the contract, it is not bound to meet the understandings if it
has received no benefits on account of them. Once it has breached
the contract, however, a breaching party who has knowingly received
benefits because of the expectations, should be required to return the

contract. In fact, the losing party usually demands and receives compensation for the potential
losses.
66. We have all heard of "bargaining in the shadow of the law"; here we are talking about
"making law in the shadow of bargains."

67. The breaching party could argue that the supplier's expectations were not worth much,
in light of his disappointing performance. For a discussion of this point, see supra Part II.
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benefits or compensate the supplier for the loss of these expectations68 up to the amount it cost the supplier to provide the benefits or
their market value; the courts will use restitution to accomplish this.
In Part 1I we dealt with two types of expectations: those expectations that a supplier hopes to receive from third persons who are not
parties to the contract, such as enhanced reputation, and those expectations that a supplier hopes to receive from the other party to the
contract, such as reciprocity. In the first case, the other party to the
contract has less control over the satisfaction of these expectations,
although it might contribute to the reputation of the other party. In
the second case, it has more control over the satisfaction of these
expectations, yet such obligations may turn out to be a too speculative
and unsuitable subject for a binding contract. In both cases the
breaching party is not legally obligated to provide these additional
benefits, and, had the party not breached the contract, the supplier
would have no claim against it either for enhanced reputation or for
reciprocity. Is our rule nonetheless too expansive?
B. Tm

EXISTENCE OF RELATED CoNtRACT AMONG THF

PARTmS

The reader might be concerned that we are proposing that restitutionary remedies be allowed for breach of expectations whenever
the other party had notice of these expectations. This is not our position. As Peter Birks writes of the British law on the subject, although
mistake is a classic ground on which restitution can be granted, mere
mistaken expectations standing alone are not the proper premise of a
suit for restitution. 69 Expectations in the contractual context, coupled
with the other party's free and knowing acceptance of the goods the
expectations have brought forth, may be another matter.
Tort law makes a similar distinction., For example, many states
have strong limits on the ability of negligence plaintiffs to recover for
68. For reasons explored at Part VIII, the measure of these benefits should be the supplier's costs or the fair market value (whichever is less) and not the increase in the defendant's
asset value produced by the supplier's efforts.
69. He writes:
Suppose... I do months of work preparing plans for your building in the confident
belief that you will give me the contract to clear the site and carry out the development.
These are predictions and, when I find myself disappointed, mispredictions. I may call
them mistakes, but they are a kind of mistake which does not count. If you stood by
without warning me that my hopes were vain, I may be able to make out a claim based
on free acceptance, but not on mistake.
Brts, supra note 23, at 147 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 153 (making the same point about
payments made in expectation of reciprocity).

1540

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1519

emotional 70 or economic71 harms when they stand alone. Plaintiffs
who cannot sue for these same items, lest an explosion of suits and
liability result,mcan~sue on these items when their suit is coupled with a
breach of a more easily provable and less-omnipresent injury. Thus,
when there is physical harm, a plaintiff can also collect for emotional
harm (such as pain and suffering) and economic harm (such as lost
wages). The provable injury opens the door to proof of these other,
"parasitic" damages.72
There is no intrinsic reason why the law should deny recovery to
purely economic and emotional harms.73 The reasons have to do with
our "imperfect technology of justice" 74 and the concern that any accident is capable of causing an almost infinite domino effect of emotional and financial harms. The requirement of a claimant's physical
damage largely obviates this expansive tendency.
In our area, there may be many reasons for denying restitutionary
remedies to suppliers for transfers made on the mistaken expectation
of non-price benefits. But two are these: difficulty of proof (for example, which items were pure gifts?), 75 and the desirability of encouraging people to be clear about the duties they hope to impose on others.
These two considerations do not have strong force in our case. The
presence of a contract gives us something definite on which to anchor
a commercial, nondonative expectation. And the difficulty of specifying all details in a contract weighs against the desire to encourage
extreme specificity.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFICIENCY
To recap briefly, we have argued that if both parties recognize
that a supplier's willingness to contract at a discounted price (or her
70. See Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
71. See Louisiana ex reL Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1027 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818, 828 (8th
Cir. 1983).
72.

W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON T E LAw OF TORTS § 12, at 56-57

(5th ed. 1984).
73. In fact, some states have moved toward allowing their recovery. See infra part VI.
Compare State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 1952) with Thing v. La
Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
74. The phrase is from BRUCE A. ACKERmAN, SoCIAL JtsiiTcE INTHE LIBMERAL STATE 20
(1980).
75. See; eg., Birs, supra note 23, at 153.,
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willingness to supply goods and services at a below-market price) 76 is
motivated by her expecting a net gain because of non-price benefits
resulting from contract completion, then she should not lose by this
discount if the other party breaches. Reliance and expectation damages may in some cases compensate her for the loss; where the value
of the damages cannot be determined with Sufficient specificity, however, an award of reliance or expectation damages would not fully
compensate her for the expected non-price benefits, or even the discount that they motivated. Restitutionary remedies may be necessary
to avoid inefficient and wasteful behavior in contexts where non-price
benefits make a contract worthwhile for the supplier.
(This is a far different proposition from that advanced by Professor Kull. He is concerned that a rule like ours would lead to inefficient and wasteful behavior.77 To the contrary, the following will
show that only our rule avoids the most likely inefficiencies and
waste.)
We argue that awarding restitution in excess of the contract price
in such cases creates efficient incentives in at least three ways.
Since the recipient realizes the supplier has a strong desire for
contract completion, in the absence of a rule like ours the recipient
may try to wring ever more price or service concessions out of the
supplier. Any expense that is incurred to extract mere transfer payments is wasteful, 78 and strategic maneuvering can be expensive. Further, a recipient who receives goods at a below-cost price may be
likely to use them wastefully. Thus, restitutionary awards will discourage the recipient of the below-cost goods from~engaging in opportunistic and wasteful behavior that might otherwise tempt him.
Second, the restitutionary remedy discourages the receiving party
from breaching the contract in contexts where such a breach would be
inefficient.7 9 The most obvious way the remedy can induce efficient
behavior is by threatening to apply an expensive negative sanction (a
76. If the supplier has provided goods or services to the breaching party, the gap between
market price (or cost) and contract price may provide a good measure of these non-price benefits. Restitution may thus, properly, allow her to recoup such benefits.
77. See Kull, supra note 8.
78. Avoiding such maneuvering can be important. For example, many commentators have
argued that the policy of achieving such avoidance is the primary justification for criminalizing
blackmail. See sources collected in Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of
Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. Rav. 1741 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, Truth and
Consequences].
79. As to a third economic concern-administrative costs-see infra Part VII.
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"stick") to recipients who might otherwise be tempted to breach inefficiently. The other way the remedy can induce efficient behavior is
by safeguarding the "carrot" that the supplier has proffered. That is,
the restitutionary remedy is an important way to enforce the carrotthe "bribe" that a supplier has paid, via discounts and the like, to
induce a recipient to stay in the contract.
Third, our remedy encourages efficient contracting that might not
otherwise take place. It does this primarily by allowing the parties to
take advantage of asymmetries of information.
A.

AvoMING WASTEFUL OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR

It has been argued that without a contract cap in place, the supplying party will wastefully engage in opportunistic behavior, trying to
provoke a breach and that the defendant will wastefully engage in
overprotective behavior trying to avoid a breach. 80 However, this is
unlikely to be a problem:"1 If the losing party has indeed induced a
breach, the court is not likely to award it the value of its services.
More importantly, where non-price benefits make an ostensibly losing
contract a mutually beneficial one, allowing restitution to be awarded
above the contract price will produce better incentives for efficient
behavior in regard to waste and other forms of opportunism than
would capping the plaintiff's award at the contract price 2 '
In these cases-which our rule defines, inter alia, as situations
where the recipient party has notice of the supplier's non-price benefits 3 -the recipient party knows of the other's eagerness to perform.
Accordingly, the recipient (like the general contractor in Muir) can
extract money from the supplier, either directly (as by bribes') or
indirectly (for example, the foot-dragging by the defendant in the
80. Kull, supra note 8, at 1506-11; see LAYcocK, TEACHER's GumE, supra note 8, at 159.
81. Those commentators who, like Professor Laycock, assume that judges often err in judging who is at breach in construction contracts will disagree. See LAYcocx, supra note 8, at 159
("The risk of error is inherent in litigation; it is especially acute in litigation over long term
contracts.... There is reason to avoid a measure of recovery that increases the stakes riding on
an uncertain decision."); Kull, supra note 8, at 1510-11.
82. Professor Kull emphasizes that the supplier will act opportunistically. But, as Professor
Kull also acknowledges, if the restitutionary award (or other modes of measuring the true value
of the contract to plaintiff) is not available, then the opportunism shoe fits on the other foot. See
Kull, supra note 8, at 1503-04.
83. For our proposed rule, see supra Part ll.C.
84. See infra part VI.C.
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Muir case). s5 Thus the opportunistic temptations open to the two parties are, to say the least, symmetrical. Further, Professor Galligan has
suggested that the tendency is for the recipients in construction contracts, not the suppliers, to be the more opportunistic parties.86
For example, the Muir defendant may have been so slow in providing the plaintiff with the needed material and energy (compressed
air) because he knew that the plaintiff was much less likely to quit the
job in a huff than were other subcontractors. In the clamor for material and energy on a big hydroelectric project, the defendant contractor in Muir may have systematically discriminated against the plaintiff,
keeping plaintiff's crews waiting uselessly but expensively for needed
material. If the general contractor had known bad behavior could
result in a money judgment reflecting plaintiff's full value (over
$200,000), he might not have been so willing to play wasteful games.
The danger of opportunism has another implication. As will be
shown by numerical example below,' in the absence of a rule like
ours, a subcontractor or architect may not enter efficient contracts out
of fear that the purchaser will manipulate her into spending more on
performance than the contract is worth to her.
In conclusion, underlying the arguments of those who favor contract-price caps is a particular image of opportunism: that, under a
rule like Muir's, a supplier who has made a bad deal will maneuver
the other party into breaching, effectively making the other party pay
for the supplier's own error or overconfidence. In the case of contracts involving significant non-price benefits, the issue separates into
two parts.
First: Does a default rule like Muir's and ours, that allows suppliers to collect for monies expended, encourage overconfident and
incompetent suppliers to get themselves (and their contracting partners) in over their heads? Second: Will a supplier who is over her
head be able to maneuver the other party into doing something that
the courts will interpret as an unjustified breach?
The latter issue is the easier to address. If a court indeed cannot
tell who is responsible for a contractual breakdown-so that a
"maneuvered-against" party is treated as a breacher rather than as a
85. If a recipient party (such as an owner or a general contractor) knows a subcontractor or
architect values the contract at a high amount, the recipient party will have an incentive to
extract this amount
86. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 840.
87. See infra part VI.C.
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rightful repudiator-then the fundamental law of construction contracts needs to be rewritten. It is not appropriate to say, "the courts
can't tell whose fault it really is,". and then formulate a remedy that
seems to be premised on the notion that the courts will get it wrong
most of the time. If the courts get it right most of the time, we submit
that the Muir rule is best.
As for the first issue-the overconfident supplier-we concede
that a contract-price rule may discourage the confident from giving
loss-leader deals more than our rule will. We even concede that perhaps a contract-cap type rule might usefully encourage the incompetent to enter another line of work.88 However, under our proposed
rule the .over-confident incompetent will not be able to recover all
costs because, under subpart (g) of the rule,'the restitutionary remedy
is limited -by the market value of what was supplied. 89 So even if the
over-confident supplier can collect a bit over the contract price, our
rule hardly induces massive over-investments by such a person.
Also, beginners and newcomers to a field are the persons most
likely to make loss-leader type offers. There is a social value in
encouraging both beginners and established firms to expand into new
fields. The default rule should be in their favor.
B.

AssuRu

G THAT

THE REcIPENT WiLL NOT BREAcH
INEFFMCIENTLY

The basic notion of "inefficient breach" is simple: The presence of
negative externalities tends to encourage over-investment in harmful
behavior. Thus, where an actor can cause harm to another without
being forced to pay a properly-calibrated amount of damages," the
actor may engage in the behavior even when the (external, social)
harm it causes outweighs the (private) benefits it brings him. 91 A contract remedy should provide the recipient party with incentive to
88. We are indebted for this argument to Professor Robert Bone, who has suggested that a
contract-price cap would usefully work- to distinguish competent from non-competent suppliers-in that the latter would simply leave the field rather than take the risk that their loss-lead
contract would simply mean long-term loss for them.
89. See supra part II.C.
90. The damage award is commonly assumed to be proper when set at a level equal to the
harm caused. For an introduction to the more complex variations that can be rung on this scenario (taking into account, in partfcular, less than certain enforcement), see A. MrrcHLL POLIN.
SKY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW & EcoNoMics 34 (2d ed. 1989).
91. See, eg., RPcsRD A. POSNER, ECONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 117 (4th ed. 1993); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24
RUTGERS L. Rnv. 273 (1970).
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breach the contract if, and only if, his benefits from the breach exceed
the expected value of the bargain to the supplier. 2 That is one reason
why in the Muir case, and in cases like it, we, argue that the remedies
should compensate the supplier with a measure that better approximates the expected value of the bargain.93
If we agree that in Boomer v. Muir the subcontractor's expectations amounted to the market value or cost of his services and not
merely to the contract price, then the contractor should not have
breached the contract unless his profit from the new opportunity
(over what the contractor would have earned from his contract with
the subcontractor) exceeded what the subcontractor expected to gain,
as reflected by his investment in supply efforts. The subcontractor had
invested over $200,000 of his own money.94 The restitutionary remedy
encourages the contractor to refrain from breaching in just this way: If
he has to pay over $200,000, he will not breach unless the new opportunity is worth at least that much extra to him.
If by contrast the contractor knew he would be required on
breach to pay only the contract price of roughly $20,000, he will have
incentive to breach whenever his benefits from the breach exceed that
trifling amount. A remedy limited to contract expectancy, such as is

92. Admittedly, we argue elsewhere in the comment for honoring a subjective expectation
of non-price benefit, without requiring further inquiry into its objective reasonableness. It might
be argued, therefore, that we claim too much here-that a subjective expectation is not a reliable guide to judgments of economic efficiency. However, as we suggest elsewhere, see infra part
Vn.D.2, this is an area in which subjective assessments may be unusually reliable. See Saul
Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Lw, 68 VA. L. REv. 771 (1982).
Thus, while a supplier's provision of goods and services may be a less than perfect measure of
the actual non-price benefits the contract will bring her, it may be the best measure available,
and certainly less likely to cause systematic errors than would a rule that always capped the
supplier's remedy at the contract price.
93. Under our rule, the restitution measure applies only in contexts where both parties are
aware of this value. There are many reasons why recovery should be allowed only if there is
notice to the potential defendant. We have previously focused on fairness-oriented reasons. See
supra part IV. However, notice also has an economic function.
Remedies will have the desired impact only if those to be affected by them have some notice
of the costs they will incur. Thus, unless both the price and non-price benefits that the plaintiff
expects are known to the recipient party (so that he knows the likely amount of a restitutionary
remedy that might be imposed upon him if he breaches), he might breach prematurely, for
example, abandoning a contract worth $200,000 to the supplier in order to pursue a new opportunity worth only $75,000.
94. Boomer v. Muir, 24 P.2d 570, 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 1933).
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proposed by Professor Kull, therefore could encourage an inefficient
breach. 95 Our rule would better avoid such breaches.
For another example, consider an architect who, wishing to establish her reputation, agrees to work for $5000 where the market value
of her work (her opportunity cost) is $20,000.96 She expects $36,000 in
reputational value to result from the completion. The building owner
expects $16,000 profit from the architect's work. When the architect
has put in $15,000 worth of work, the defendant is tempted by an
opportunity that would earn him $9,000 more than he's making from
the instant contract, but would require him to repudiate his contract
with the architect. If he repudiates, it will mean a societal loss of at
least $16,000 (that is, the excess of $36,000 over $20,000) which
exceeds $9000. Let us assume that precedent tells the building owner
that if he breaches, he will have to pay the architect a total of $15,000
(less contract monies already paid) as our proposal would require.
Such a payment would wipe out his anticipated gain from the new
contract. Our rule would thus help society to avoid an allocative loss.
C.

EFFECrUATING COASIAN

"BRmFs"

1. Inefficient Breaches and Transaction Costs
Ian Macneil has pointed out that, but for transaction costs, inefficient breaches Will be avoided regardless of the remedial rule a court
adopts. For instance, even if the recipient's liability were capped at
the contract price, a supplier who valued the contract at a higher
amount could "bribe" the recipient to stay in the contract, 97 much as
Professor Coase suggests that parties can "bargain around" inefficient
legal rules. 8 Thus, one might draw from Professor Macneil's Coasian
analysis the lesson that, in the absence of transaction costs, nothing
hangs on the choice between a limited restitution rule and a rule like
ours that allows plaintiffs to collect in excess of the contract price. If
95. However, in cases of truly losing contracts, or in cases where non-price benefits could
be recoverable under reliance or expectation theories, the Muir rule would not be necessary to
achieve proper discouragement of inefficient breaches.
96. See Knapp v. Gaston Teyssier, 96 Pa. Super. 193 (1929), for a possible variant of such a
case.
97. Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Cohtract" Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. Rv. 947
(1982) [hereinafter Macneil, Efficient Breach].
98. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Ecom. 1 (1960). Professor
Coase argued, inter alia, that in the absence of transaction costs, the law's initial placement of
legal entitlements would be irrelevant to efficiency: When the law failed to award a resource to
the highest-valued user, that user could pay the other party ("bribe" him) to transfer the
resource.
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transaction costs are low enough, the parties can compensate for any
failure in the law by paying to alter the pattern of resource use. With
these payments, which the literature ironically terms "bribes," 99 one
party can persuade the other party to undertake value-maximizing
behavior.
Professor Macneil's argument would not much undermine the
importance of our thesis, however. First, in cases where breach occurs
unexpectedly, transaction costs are likely to be sizeable and not symmetrical. We believe (by "casual empiricism"''1 ) that parties who are
about to breach rarely warn the other party in time to enable them to
offer a pre-breach Coasian bribe to stay in the contract. If this is so, a
proper crafting of the remedial rule is necessary. Second, and more
importantly, when Coasian bribes are paid, restitutionary awards
make them workable.
2.

Our Basic Argument: EncouragingEfficient Contractingby
Utilizing Informational Asymmetries

The whole point of the supplier giving a large price discount to
the recipient is to persuade the latter to stay in a contract from which
the supplier expects non-price benefits that the recipient is not
required legally to give. Contracts containing such discounts may be
value-maximizing and may not occur unless the discount is refundable
in cases of the recipient's breach. This is what the restitution remedy,
freed of a contract-price cap, can accomplish.
The price discount that a supplier agrees to in the hope of nonprice benefits is a Coasian bribe, and one paid well in advance of the
other party's possible breach. Similarly, the goods or services that a
supplier provides outside the strict requisites of a contract may be a
Coasian bribe. The restitutionary remedy essentially mandates that
99. Although the law and economics literature conventionally refers to Coasian payments
as "bribes," the term is in fact a deliberate irony. Taken literally, it is a misnomer. As Ronald
Coase has pointed out, the term "bribe" connotes something illicit, while there is nothing necessarily illicit about making payments to alter the assignment of legal entitlements-far from it.
Telephone Interview with Ronald H. Coase, Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School (June 20, 1994). As Professor Coase points out in The Problem of Social Cost, the very
point of the market is to enable persons to shift resource entitlements to their highest-valued
uses. Coase, supra note 98.
100. We agree with Professor Macneil that the efficient-breach theory "is simply [a matter]
of relative transaction costs in which no a priori assumptions can be made about the efficiency"
of any particular remedy. Macneil, Efficient Breach, supra note 97, at 953 n.23. But it is not
outrageous to use casual empiricism (as he notes), id.
at 953 n.25, to estimate the likely transaction costs and institutional patterns.
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these bribes be refunded if the recipient breaches the contract; the
remedy therefore provides enforcement for Coasian bribes which may
be necessary to -ensure efficient resource use.
In theory such bribes could also be enforced by explicit contractual provisions. However, the complexity and messiness that characterize some contracts, such as the typical ongoing construction
project, 1' 1 may preclude continual specification by explicit agreement.
Enforcement of these bribes is necessary if the law is to encourage
efficient contracting by persons who value contract completion above
the contract price they can obtain.
Also, our rule makes it easier for the parties to avail themselves
of an asymmetry in information: In most cases the supplier knows the
quality of her goods and services better than the recipient does, and is
better able to calculate the odds that she will do good enough work
that her hopes of reputational advantage or reciprocity will materialize. With our rule, such a supplier can bet on herself' z without
requiring the other party to bet on more than his own likelihood of
contract completion.
3. EncouragingEfficient Contracting:A Numerical Example
A rule that did not enforce Coasian bribes could discourage
young architects or gung-ho contractors from selling their services
efficiently.' 3 With a default rule such as Professor Kull's, that prohibited such suppliers from recovering the value of their services in case
of a buyer's breach, such suppliers might fear that after they had sunk
significant costs into performing, the other party could manipulate
them into expending still more. As a result, they could refuse to make
an efficient contract now, out of fear that the other party's opportunism might deprive them of the benefit of their Coasian bribes, and
require them to "pay" even more than the contract was worth to
them.
The price discounts themselves may lock the supplying party into
bad contracts if the discounts cannot be recovered. For example, in a
Muir-type case, assume that contract completion is worth $190,000 to
the subcontractor ($170,000 in non-price benefits, plus $20,000 contract price). Assume further that the subcontractor has already
101. See infra part VII.B.
102. Cf. Levmore, supra note 92 (discussing self-assessment of damages).
103. This might be particularly likely to occur in a buyer's market, where many architects
were available. Cf. id. (discussing the self-assessment of damages).
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"sunk" $189,000 into performance when the general contractor continues his foot-dragging. At this point, the subcontractor has two
choices: either repudiating the contract, or sinking even more money
(say, another $40,000) into performance. Without a restitutionary
rule, the subcontractor upon repudiation would receive in his lawsuit
only the contract price, approximately $20,000-a loss to the subcontractor of $169,000 ($189,000 already expended less the contract price
of $20,000). If the contract when completed would be worth $190,000
to him, the subcontractor will lose less by continuing to perform$39,000104-than he would by repudiation-which would involve a
loss of $169,000. As a result, he would continue perforce to perform.
If a restitutionary rule, like that proposed above, 0 5 is in place, he
could receive $189,000 if he sues-giving him a tool to "persuade" the
other party stop its foot-dragging and perhaps even renegotiate the
contract price. 1°6
In this way the subcontractor might (absent the proposed rule) be
forced into paying much more than the contract was worth to him.
The restitution rule, by contrast, might discourage the general contractor from doing such foot-dragging in the first place, and assure the
subcontractor that he will not be manipulated into a net loss position.
He will then feel freer to enter into efficient contracts.
D. Two

CHALLENGES

1. Second-Order or Second-Best Allocative Effects
Even the simplest case can be criticized as ignoring second-best
problems and second-order effects. For example, against our thesis it
might be argued that the reputational or other non-price benefits in a
case like Boomer v. Muir may represent merely a private benefit with
no allocative consequences. In such an instance, what appears to be
efficient may not in reality be so.
Consider, for example, our argument regarding the desirability of
preventing inefficient breaches. In the above architect example the
104. The $39,000 is the plaintiff's costs of $229,000 ($189,000 already sunk, plus $40,000
more to be expended), less $190,000 as the value of contract completion.
105. See supra part I.C.
106. Ideally, this renegotiated price would cover additional costs attributable to the footdragging. However, there is a possibility that the supplier could use the repudiation option to
squeeze additional monies out of the other party. This consideration puts a challenge to our
rule, discussed above at Part VI.A.
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proposed rule appeared to provide society a means to avoid an allocafive loss by encouraging the building owner not to breach. However,
the private gain to the architect may not really have translated into
the same amount of allocative gain. By establishing herself as an
independent architect via this project, the plaintiff may simply draw
future business that comes at the expense of other architects, so that
the reputational gain might be basically transferred from these other
architects to her without representing an allocative gain. If so, the
building owner's temptation may not have represented an inefficient
breach after all.
In such a context, we can only speculate about the form secondorder effects might take. But it seems likely that if the architect's reputation did grow in the way she hopes, it would increase the price
competition among architects, which is allocatively desirable. Thus,
though it is difficult to give a precise value to the allocative pay-off
from deterring this defendant's breach, the likely effect of adopting a
restitutionary measure of relief seems positive. 1' 7
2. DiscouragingSome Potentially Efficient Contracts
It might be argued that under our rule, some potentially efficient
contracts might not be entered into. Conceivably, a potential
employer of hungry suppliers or up-and-coming young architects will
not do business with them out of fear that if he breaches, he will have
to pay a restitutionary award above the contract price (or that the
threat of such a remedy will force him to disadvantageously renegotiate the contract price).' 08 If some such forgone contracts may be efficient ones, it would be argued, this may decrease the economic gains
otherwise to be achieved through our rule.
Whether or not otherwise efficient contracts would be forgone as
a result of our rule, 10 9 the opposite rule causes at least an equal degree
107. Moreover, the issue of "second best" applies not only to our rule but to any rule. Thus,
a limited-restitutionary rule would face the same challenge, and Professor Kull has made no
showing that in a second-best world the direction of the shifts caused by his rule would be as
likely as ours to be positive.
108. Such fear may be particularly likely if our rule applies even when a purchaser's breach
is caused by factors outside of his control. Our current rule does not limit the application of
above-contract-price restitutionary awards to instances where the defendant has breached in bad
faith. As indicated, we have not ruled out the possibility that such a limitation may be desirable.
See infra note 145.
109. The forgone-contract problem will likely be a difficulty only in the case of a buyer's
market, that is, where the buyers have many suppliers of goods and services vying for their
business and can pick and choose among them. In a seller's market, where, for example, a
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of loss. That is, as discussed above,11° without our rule, potential suppliers may be discouraged from entering into efficient contracts out of
a fear they will be manipulated into putting more into contract performance than the contract is worth to them.
Finally, the parties can reverse our rule by agreement. For example, a young architect who plans on giving below-cost services and
wants to reassure potential clients that their liability will be limited,
can waive any restitutionary claim.'
Admittedly, the opposite rule is equally reversible by the parties.
But there is an advantage in making our rule the default in non-losing
contract situations: The silence allowed by our rule permits the flexibility necessary to so many construction contract situations, particularly in cases where the parties' duties are interdependent, as in
Muir." 2
E.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MEASURE OF ENRIcHMENT:

PLAINTIFF'S COSTS, MARKET VALUE OF PLAINTIFF'S

PERFORMANCE, OR DEFENDANT'S GAIN

Of the many possible measures of unjust enrichment that might
be used in these cases, let us consider three: One measure is the plaintiff's costs; a second is the market value of what the plaintiff supplied;
and a third is the increase in the value of the defendant's assets" 3 that
resulted from the plaintiff's efforts. Under our rule,"14 we propose
setting a restitutionary remedy equal to either of the first two measures, whichever is less.
We chose whatever is less between these first two measures in
order to keep the plaintiff working efficiently. Even if the subcontractor is maneuvered into doing extra work, she should spend no more
5
on that extra performance than a competent subcontractor would."
If she is working efficiently, her costs should be close to the market
landowner may be desperate for a competent architect or contractor to begin work on her land,
such contract discouragement is unlikely to take place.
110. See supra part VI.C3.
111. By bargaining for low liquidated damages the parties can contract out of restitutionary
awards. See Lars A. Stole, The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in ContractualEnvironments with Private Information, 8 J.L.

EcoN.

& ORG. 582 (1992).

112. See infra part VII.B.
113. A fuller discussion would separately parse, for example, defendant's subjective valuation and the market valuation of the asset.
114. See supra part ll.C.
115. See infra part VIII.B.
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value. To the extent the costs are significantly higher, fairness to the
defendant nevertheless suggests that the most that can be asked of
him is to make the plaintiff whole.
More controversially, we argue that either of the first two measures (plaintiff's cost or market value of plaintiff's effort) is preferable
to awarding the plaintiff only the amount of enrichment the defendant
experienced. We make this recommendation-despite the fact that it
may be perceived as inconsistent with the restitutionary impulse 116 _
as a means of assuring that the economic functions of our rule can be
achieved.
Measuring restitution only by the defendant's gain would
encourage the defendant to'be wasteful with plaintiff's efforts. The
defendant should instead be encouraged to value what he receives at
its full market value. The contractor in the Muir case undoubtedly
valued plaintiff's goods and services at less than market price because
that is how the contractor was charged and that is how he behaved.
That is, had the defendant known that he would be required to pay
the full market value, he would not have dragged his feet on providing
material and energy to the subcontractor. To limit the amount he will
have to pay upon breach to the value he gained from plaintiff's performance-rather than requiring the defendant to pay something
equivalent to the social loss-would merely repeat the mistake.
Another reason for setting the measure of restitutionary remedy
at social loss is to deter inefficient breach, as discussed above. Also,
unless the contract remedy effectively returns to suppliers any discount they gave the recipient in the expectation of non-price benefits,
some suppliers will be discouraged from entering into efficient contracts. To avoid this result, the measure of relief should be keyed
more to the plaintiff's loss (or the value of the plaintiff's effort) rather
than keyed to the defendant's gain.
VII. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
A. INTRODUCTION
Ordinarily, law does not require people to pay for all benefits
which they receive in nondonative contexts. That is so even where
they are aware of the other party's expectations for which the benefits
are given, and even when they in bad faith violate those expectations.
116. See, e.g., Pettit, supranote 6 (arguing that using a measure tied to plaintiff's loss rather
than defendant's gain is indicative of a non-restitutionary rationale).
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One of the reasons for the law is the concern that an inquiry into such
expectations will result in judicial administrative costs that are too
high. Under a limited set of circumstances, however, the award of
restitution for such expectations may impose only low administrative
costs: where a contract exists, which the courts must perforce investigate, and where by its nature, judicial administration may be less
expensive (and more practical) than requiring detailed specification of
mutually advantageous contract terms and the parties' expectations.
Such is suggested by our arguments elsewhere. 117
The argument for limiting restitutionary remedies to the contract
price in cases such as Muir rests in part on the desirability of using
judicial resources frugally: The costs of ascertaining the contract price
are said to be significantly lower than the costs of ascertaining the
market price or the plaintiff's costs118 because, Professor Kull argues,
the supplier's expectations are not sufficiently specific. 119 Therefore,
as a measure of the remedy, contract price is preferable. We argue
that Professor Kull's concern with administrative costs is appropriate
but overstated for a number of reasons.
First, although contractual specificity reduces the costs of judicial
administration, the cases in which courts grant restitution meet an
acceptable standard of specificity, although a somewhat lower standard. More importantly, many contracts are not amenable to a high
degree of certainty; they deal with unpredictable and changeable situations in which specific provisions may be virtually impossible to
establish. Many of the cases in which courts grant restitution involved
precisely such contracts (for example, construction contracts).
Second, even assuming that the costs of distinguishing between
truly and apparently losing contracts and the costs of ascertaining
measures of the plaintiff's non-price intangible benefits are higher
than the costs of ascertaining the contract prices, we argue that the
difference is relatively small. Professor Kull's own rule requires courts
to make inquiries outside the four corners of the contract. 2 0
117. For a discussion of the inability to sue for expectations standing alone, see supra Part V.
This theme is also developed further immediately below. See infra text accompanying notes 11821.
118. Kull, supra note 8, at 1495.
119. Id.
120. As we understand Professor Kull's proposed rule, the cost savings of utilizing contract
price will be one-sided. Contract price will serve as a ceiling on restitutionary damages, not as a
floor. His proposed rule would allow the breaching defendant to seek judicial evaluation of the
plaintiff's part performance if the defendant argues that the plaintiff's actual costs or market
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Third, in designing rules, courts can legitimately decide that justice and economics are not coterminous and that justice must be the
leading factor. While one can debate the proper interplay between
economics and "other justice,"' 21 we need not enter here into such a
debate extensively, for we argue that our approach "buys" a more just
approach at only minimal economic cost to the system. Thus,
although we believe that saving judicial costs by requiring extreme
specificity in a contract may be a good thing, it is not good enough to
trump the real and fair expectations of the parties.
In the next section we discuss the type of contract that is not amenable to specificity and closure and that because of its nature renders
judicial interference inevitable. Then we demonstrate the limited
nature of the additional administrative costs involved in distinguishing
between truly and apparently losing contracts and the limited additional administrative costs involved in quantifying restitutionary
awards.
B.

CoTmRAcr SPEcIFicrTY AND CoNR'Acr CLOSURE

The argument that all or most non-price benefits should not be
recognized under contract law is based on a view of a contract as a
"spot" relationship: impersonal, usually relatively short-term, and
"frozen." In contrast to agreements within ongoing relationships, this
type of contract must contain specific and unchangeable terms,
designed to limit, rather than leave room for, renegotiation. 122 In a
mobile society, where excess performance costs to the parties cannot
be later adjusted within the framework of an ongoing relationship, this
contract model is useful and appropriate-specificity and closure are
crucial to reduce misunderstandings and breaches of contract. Further, in an unstable environment, contract specificity and closure bring
additional benefits, such as providing each party a basis for future
planning.
price are lower than the contract price. Under the proposed rule, therefore, judicial costs will be
reduced with respect to the plaintiff's claims but not with respect to the defendant's claims.
121. See, ag., CALABRESi, supra note 30, at 289-308; THOMAS NAGEL, THE ViEw FROM
NOWHERE 185-88 (1986) (discussing generally the interplay between deontologic and consequentialist ethics); Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: CorrectiveJustice and Its UtilitarianCon-

straints,8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1978); see also Gordon, Truth and Consequences,supranote 78, at
1785 (One's "final judgment on ... any law... should depend neither on consequentialism nor
on deontologic morality, but on some as yet unstated combination of the two.").
122. Professor Macneil has identified the problem of specificity costs as a governance problem, for which the courts provide rules of adjusting the contract terms. Macneil, supra note 61;
see also Galligan, supra note 23 (identifying the same problem).
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Some types of contracts, however, by their very nature, cannot be
sufficiently specific or provide total closure. These types of contracts
are especially amenable to restitutionary remedies, where greater
judicial discretion is inescapable."z
The Muir case and similar construction cases provide a good illustration of such contracts. Specific and predetermined terms in construction contracts are costly" because construction involves many
unknown and unpredictable developments and is likely to require
continuous contract changes. Therefore, these contracts do not contain the terms that cover all eventualities and do not lend themselves
to full closure. Even the most detailed of these contracts might cover
a smaller percentage of possible contingencies than other types of
contracts, and everyone involved understands that the contract serves
as a framework for renegotiation. A party may give more than is
specified in the contract and expect to be rewarded, either during the
contract period or later."z
In the Muir case, for example, the allocation of the parties' obligations and decisionmaking power required continuous cooperation
and adjustments among them. Much depended on mutual self-limitation. Because the contractor was paying for materials and energy, the
subcontractor had little self-interested incentive to use them frugally; 12 because the subcontractor was paying his crew's wages, the
contractor had little self-interested incentive to keep the subcontractor's crew fully occupied. Similarly, while the subcontractor undertook to finish the work within a specific period, the contractor
123. It has been suggested that the doctrine within restitution law that has the primary role
in cases like Boomer v. Muir-namely, quantum mendt-has its roots in the common law rather
than in equity. See Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, LAW & CoNTrMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53. That is largely irrelevant, however, the role of judicial discretion that has been
traditionally thought of as "equitable" is now spread throughout our system, largely without
reference to whether the matter at issue has historical roots on the law or the equity side. I. at
71-73.
In any event, the suggestion that restitution's roots are primarily legal may not be entirely
accurate because throughout the centuries the common law courts have absorbed into contract
law the holding and remedies of the chancery courts. See, eg., A.W.B. SI'USON, The PenalBond
with ConditionalDefeasance, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY: EssAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 111 (1987).

124. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 811.
125. Just as it is costly to specify the parties' obligations in the contract in advance, it can be
also costly to specify all the interim arrangements on which the parties agree during the contract
period. Many terms might be left open, and, we assume that in most cases the parties renegotiate and settle.
126. The contractor therefore also asserted control over the energy and power in breach of
the contract.
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controlled the work's progress by determining when to supply the
materials and power. Thus, each party's performance depended on
the cooperation of the other; that made it difficult for the parties to
determine their responsibilities with accuracy in advance. It is not surprising that during the contract period the parties renegotiated the
terms of the contract. This contract was amenable to mutual adjustments, not to specificity or,closure. 2 7
Arguably, the supplying party should specify in the contract that
non-price benefits exist and should be recouped if the other party
breaches the contract. The answer to this argument is, first, that it is
costly to specifically add such expectations, especially to anticipate
accurately all situations where one party or the other will bear the
risk. Second, the recipient party has no real need for such specification to protect himself from paying the supplier more than the worth
of what he has received, since if the architect or other supplier overestimated her abilities, the market price for services of the quality she
rendered will cap the measure of relief, even under a restittltionary
rule.'2 Third, we make a normative claim: If what the supplier gives
is indeed worth more than the contract price, and the recipient
breaches, then it is legitimate to charge the recipient for what he has
received. If this normative claim is correct, it should be up to the
party seeking the non-fair allocation to so specify.
C.

WHAT RULE SHOULD THE COURTS ADOPT?

If Professor Kull is right about truly losing contracts and we are
right about apparently losing contracts, what rule should the courts
adopt? If administrative costs were zero, we would recommend a rule
requiring the courts to distinguish between the two kinds of contracts
and apply our pro-restitution rule in cases of ostensibly but not truly
losing contracts, and Professor Kull's narrow restitution approach in
cases of truly losing contracts.
In the real world, however, cost must be considered. The question then is: What rule would involve the highest costs? Would it be
(i) a rule under which courts would try to distinguish between the two
127. See Galligan, supra note 23, at 800.
128. See sub-part (g) of the proposed rule, supra Part IJ.C. On the contrary, it might be
argued that being forced to pay even market price for something one hasn't ordered causes
harm. (Ibis is sometimes known as the argument of "subjective valuation.") This argument has
only limited merit in the context where the party being charged is a wrongdoer-a breaching
party.
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classes of cases? (ii) a rule where courts would apply our pro-restitution rule to all cases, thus triggering the costs and arguable injustices
that critics of the majority rule are concerned about in losing contract
situations? ('ii) a rule under which courts would cap the plaintiff's
recovery at the contract price in all cases, thus triggering the costs and
arguable injustices about which our Comment is concerned?
D.

ADmmnsTRATrv- COSTS

INVOLVED IN OUR PROPOSED

APPROACH

1. The Costs of DistinguishingBetween Actually and Ostensibly
Losing Contracts
A rule that requires courts to distinguish between losing and
seemingly losing contracts could be costly, involving the courts in factual investigation of the truthfulness, reasonableness, and accuracy of
the plaintiff's expectations. Yet, in some cases relatively little cost is
involved in judicial distinction between losing and apparently losing
contracts.
For example, as we discussed earlier, the presence of an
extremely deep discount at the time of contracting will signal that
both parties probably knew what they were doing, in expectation of
non-price benefits. 29 Conversely, if the "loss" occurs because of an
unanticipated, sudden change in market price after contract formation, this will likely indicate that the supplier's loss did not result from
in both
a calculated reach for non-price benefits. The determination
30
cases is unlikely to involve high administrative costs.'
2. The Costs of Quantifying Non-price Benefits
We assume that in most cases where there is, at the time of the
contract formation, a large difference between the contract price on
the one hand, and the market price or the supplier's costs on the other
hand, this difference represents the intangible advantages that the
supplier expects from the contract or its completion. That is, the supplier's investment in the contract above the price he expects to receive
can be a measure of the non-price benefits he expects.
129. This analysis may be complicated if duration was an important part of the contract. See
supra part mH.A3.
130. As for high performance costs that result from disagreements over what the contract
requires the supplier to do, see supranote 23 (showing that our restitutionary approach is consistent with the pattern Professor Galligan has seen in these cases).

1558

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1519

In these situations, the judicial costs of quantifying the non-price
expected benefits from the contract would be quite low. Once nonprice expectations are shown, 31 the courts would establish the difference between the contract and market prices. That difference could
constitute the amount by which the supplier valued the contract's
existence and completion 132 and provide a more accurate measure of
the supplier's reliance and expectation losses than will the contract
price. This method helps quantify and monetize subjective expectations and answers one of the objections to the majority rule and to our
argument. For example, the supplier's costs can be established by
receipts and other proof of payment. Even though the establishment
of market price depends on the liquidity of the market, in many cases
1 33
market price can be ascertained with little effort.
In addition, the courts have not one but two measures by which
to evaluate expected non-price benefits: the supplier's actual costs
(easily verifiable by receipts and means of payments) and the market
price, which may be often (not always) easily available. The market
price for the supplier's services and goods provides an inexpensive
method to test whether her costs were too high due to inefficient performance. The supplier's costs can help ascertain the market price in
an illiquid market.
The same reliance on supplier's costs (or market value) should be
followed even if the supplier overestimated the intangible benefits
that she would receive from the contract. Admittedly, in such a case
the supplier would offer services at a contract price that is too low,
and the difference between this low price and market price would be
too high to represent the supplier's expectations objectively. If proof
of the objective value of expectations were allowed, the costs of judicial administration would indeed rise. 3 4 Professor Kull's objection to
131. See the proposed rule, supra Part ll.C.
132. If the supplier really did not value the contract, she would not continue to perform but
would rather agree with the defendant to terminate the relationship. The facts of cases such as
Muir, however, are otherwise: The underpricing supplier continues to perform; she is not the one
who breaches.
133. We admit this will not always be the case.
134. A factual inquiry into such questions could be expensive. For example, the supplier
may have assigned a 40% probability to the expectation that the contract would enhance her
reputation and bring her jobs worth $100,000; or she may have believed that there was a 40%
probability that the other party would reciprocate with future assignments worth $100,000; or,
perhaps like the subcontractor in Muir, she may have continued to perform at a loss due to the
other party's breach because she evaluated her chance of obtaining $100,000 worth of additional
work at 40%. In all these cases the supplier would rationally have invested in the contract any
amount up to $40,000 (40% of $100,000). Suppose, however, that the hopes of the plaintiff/
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restitutionary remedy in the Muir case then might be more compelling, even as to the ostensibly losing, but actually profitable contracts
on which we focus.
Our answer to this counter-argument and the concern with
administrative burden is as follows: Plaintiffs may, and indeed do, err
in evaluating probabilities of intangible benefits ex ante. But so long
as a defendant has notice of a plaintiff's expectations, and so long as
plaintiff gave the defendant benefits because of her expectations, such
errors should be deemed legally irrelevant in cases such as ours.13 5
Market value (or cost) should be the governing measure. A supplier's
overly optimistic expectations will benefit the other party if that party
does not breach and benefit the supplier if the other party does
breach.136 Moreover, it is the defendant, the receiving party, who has
the cost 137 of the plainthe power to decide which party would bear
38
tiff's potentially unwarranted optimism.'
Further, there may be little substantive payoff from allowing
proof on whether plaintiff's expectations are realistic. Evaluation of
probabilities ex ante is rarely exact; what may seem unrealistic and
erroneous post facto may be rational ex ante. Besides, the supplier's
calculation of probabilities should be determined as of the contract
date; these probabilities, which may change thereafter, are highly
speculative. Therefore, we believe that a breaching party who has
received benefits as a result of a supplier's expectations should be
allowed to argue only that he had no notice of the other party's expectation. If he had such notice, the breaching party should not be
allowed to raise the issue of how justified the supplier's expectations
were. The plaintiff's expenditures-which can be determined with a
fair degree of ease-should be sufficient proof.
subcontractor were far too high and that the defendant could show that plaintiff's expectations
should not have exceeded a 15% chance of $100,000 (for an expected value of $15,000).
135. Legal irrelevancies give rise to little in the way of judicial administrative cost. The
amount expended-its cost or market price-should be the measure of relief. Even if the
receiving party breaches and is required to pay for expenditures that the plaintiff made on the
basis of an unrealistic expectation, the breaching party (like the contractor in Muir) has received
the benefit of these expenditures.
136. The gain from the breaches, however, is not likely to provide the supplier with incentives to cause a breach. This argument is discussed in Part VI of this Comment.
137. Thus, if the contract price is unrealistically low, so long as the receiving party does not
breach the contract it benefits from the supplier's mistaken expectations. If the receiving party
does breach the contract, it will pay a restitutionary award that is higher than plaintiff's objective
expectation.
138. For a discussion of opportunistic behavior, see supra Part VI.A.
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Thus, while it is true that the contract price is easily ascertainable,
it is also true that generally there are easily-derived market figures for
the cost (or value) of most of the supplied goods and services. The
difference between the two figures can be established with relatively
little additional expense to the judicial system.
E.

COMPARING THE ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS OF OTHER OPTIONS

The current judicial majority rule does not distinguish between
losing and non-losing contracts. Neither does the approach of Professor Kull who would cap the recovery at the contract price. We think
that an overbroad rule can be legitimate whenever the likely administrative cost of distinguishing between the truly losing contracts and
the seemingly losing contracts exceeds the allocative costs of the
overbreadth.
The majority rule is likely to have fewer overbreadth costs than a
rule like Professor Kull's if we are correct that business people will
usually be rational and informed. Under our assumptions, in the cases
when business people'-agree to provide goods or services at substantially lower price than market price, or continue to perform contracts
at highly discounted prices, ostensibly losing contracts will far outnumber real losing contracts. For if contracts are truly losers, business
people will seek to be released of them when the other party to the
contract seems to wish release also. Therefore, when the administrative costs of distinguishing between apparently and truly losing contracts are very high, the current majority rule is probably better than
the one Professor Kull is recommending.
VIII. IS IT REALLY RESTITUTION?
A. Is

IT REALLY RESTITUTION IF THE RECOVERY EXCEEDS THE
CONTRACT PRICE?

Some commentators argue that awards in excess of the contract
price cannot be justified by the law of restitution. For example, one of
Professor Kuil's primary contentions is that, as a conceptual and definitional matter, a defendant contracting party cannot be "unjustly
enriched" by possessing what the plaintiff has given him in the course
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of performing the contract if the defendant is required to pay the contract price. 39 Once that price is paid, Professor Kull argues, there is
no enrichment left for which plaintiff can seek restitution.' 4°
We agree with Professor Kull that it can be appropriate for a restitution court to look to the parties to evaluate the worth of what they
expect to receive during the course of a contract. 4 But such an analysis hardly leads unequivocally to Professor Kull's result. In our view,
the Muir-type rule that we advocate requires the defendant to give the
plaintiff the closest equivalent to what, in exchange for plaintiff's performance, he agreed to pay initially: contract price and contract
completion.
Moreover, the Muir-type result is consistent with the principle
that Peter Birks, in his treatise on the English law of restitution, calls
"free acceptance."' 142 Professor Birks suggests, as a doctrinal matter,
that parties who give benefits in the hope of being repaid have a
ground for seeking restitution if the receiving party knew the first was
giving the goods or services "in the. expectation of being repaid," and
was in a position to disabuse the supplying party of his expectation but
refused to do so in the hope of getting something for nothing. In such
a case, the recipient may be liable in quantum meruit (for goods) or
quantum valebat (for services). An example Professor Birks gives is
of a window cleaner who comes to his house
merely in the hope that I, like my various neighbors, would want the
[windows] done and would agree to pay.... [HIad I been out, he
would have had no basis on which to claim restitution. But because
I stood by and tacitly accepted the work he can... claim its reasonable value. This, therefore, is the essential point: -volunteers who
are disappointed
risk-takers can get restitution on the basis of free
143
acceptance.

Like a building proprietor who coyly hides behind the curtains until
the window washer has cleaned each pane, or like a homeowner who
139. Kull, supra note 8, at 1478-84.
140. 1&L
141. We do no more than concede it may sometimes be appropriate to proceed in this way.
But even if we were to concede arguendo Professor Kull's larger contention-that a restitution
court must always defer to the parties' pre-performance contractual evaluations, id.-our result
differs from his because we have a different view of the parties' pre-performance expectations.
142. See BIRKs, supra note 23, at 265-93. Professor Birks' "free acceptance" principle may
be 6verbroad; that is, from both a policy and doctrinal perspective, "free acceptance" may not
always provide a sufficient justification for granting restitution. Nevertheless, some notion akin
to "free acceptance" is surely operative in the case law and is suggestive for the problem at hand.
143. Id.at 266, 104.
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stands, by while his neighbor builds a party wall that the homeowner
knows the neighbor expects him to help pay for,1" the defendant in
Muir should not be able to come out at the last minute 145 and disown
what he has irrevocably received.
B. Is IT

REALLY RESTITUTION IF THE RECOVERY EXCEEDS THE
INCREASE IN THE VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S ASSETS?

One may ask: Is the majority rule really restitutionary if it
requires a defendant to do more than disgorge-that is, if it requires
payment of more in a lawsuit than an amount representing the value
(subjective or objective) that the defendant places on the benefit
received? Definitions of restitution typically focus on "the recapture
of a benefit conferred on the defendant" and remedies that measure
"recoveries... by the amount of a defendant's unjust enrichment. ' 146
Yet under our rule a defaulting defendant may have to pay out an
amount equivalent to the plaintiffs costs (or to the value of the goods
and services that the plaintiffprovided), even if this amount is higher
than the increase in the asset value 47 produced by the plaintiff's
efforts. As a result, our rule might48 be criticized as inconsistent with
1
standard definitions of restitution.
144. See Day v. Caton, 119 Mass. 513 (1876) (stating that "silence with a knowledge that
another was doing valuable work for [one's] benefit, and with the expectation of payment" may,
as a factual matter, "indicate[ I that consent which would give rise to the inference of a contract"). Note this is a case where a contract could be implied in fact, while we are dealing with
contracts implied in law. In a case like Day, we think either analysis could be used.
145. It might be argued when a recipient like the defendant in Muir is silent while receiving
significantly discounted benefits, that silence does not necessarily hide a bad faith desire (like
that of the homeowner in the window-washer example) to get something for nothing. Perhaps
the recipient is in good faith during the bulk of the supplier's performance and only at the last
minute discovers an irresistible temptation which leads him to breach the contract. Our current
"rule", see supra part II.C, does not distinguish between good faith and bad faith receipt of
discounted supplies; we have not closed our minds to the possibility that it might be advisable to
make such a distinction.
146.

LON L. FuLIan & MELVIN ARON EisENBERa,

BAsic CoNTRAcr LAW 295 (4th ed.

1981) (emphasis added).
147. The reference to the defendant's "asset value" assumes that the defendant is the owner
on whose project the supplier/plaintiff was working. The concept is equally applicable when the
defendant is merely responsible for a project on a third party's land-in such a case, the
"increase in asset value" might be translated into the "decrease in the defendant's responsibilities" produced by plaintiff.
Thus, the defendant in Muir did not own the land on which the hydroelectric dam was built;
his concern was with fulfilling the duties of a general contractor. He fulfilled these duties by,
among other things, hiring subcontractors like the plaintiff. A narrow view of restitution might
argue that the plaintiff had benefitted the defendant only to the extent the plaintiff's efforts had
saved the defendant money in fulfilling his overall responsibilities.
148. See Kull, supra note 8, at 1480; Petit, supra note 6.
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However, such a criticism would depend on defining the slippery
notions of "benefit conferred" or "unjust enrichment." Looking to
the increase in a defendant's asset value is not the only plausible way
to measure the defendant's enrichment; it is equally plausible to argue
that a defendant that received goods and services at a discount and
then breached the contract is enriched at least to the extent of the
discount on the price.
Moreover, the Boomer v. Muir case also demonstrates how parties can change their balance of power within the contract and move
towards a fiduciary relationship, which lends itself to restitutionary
remedies. In the Muir case, the contractor controlled the timing of
the delivery of the materials to the subcontractor. In addition, and in
violation of his contract obligation, the contractor retained control
over the source of energy that the subcontractor needed to perform
his tasks. Thus, the contractor "misappropriated" the power to use
the source of energy that belonged to the subcontractor and diverted
the use to some other works in which the contractor was engaged.
Arguably, the benefits that the contractor received from such a
wrongful use rightly belonged to the subcontractor.
Or, alternatively, it might be argued that the defendant received
the "benefit" which he sought or accepted, namely, goods and services, from the plaintiff.1 4 9 That being so, it may not be inconsistent
with a proper respect for the defendant's autonomy to assume that the
defendant saw the performance as itself a benefit to him. Certainly
the defendant might have been wrong-the performance may end up
being more costly than the increase in asset value it produced-and
certainly the defendant might have hoped to get the goods and services at a below-market price. But if he has induced or accepted these
items, it seems appropriate to make the defendant pay their market
price (or cost, whichever is less) since by committing a breach so
material that the other party is entitled to repudiate, the defendant
has forfeited the contract through which he might have obtained the
below-market price. 150
149. This is the rationale implied by United States v. Zara Contracting, Inc., 146 F.2d 606,
611 (2d Cir. 1944) (Since the "plaintiff's performance here is 'part of the very performance' for
which the defendant had bargained, 'it is to be valued... by the amount for which such services
and materials as constituted the part performance could have been purchased from one in the
plaintiff's position at the time they were rendered.'") (quoting RESTATEmENT (FiRST) OF CoNTRACTS § 347 cmt. c (1932)).
150. Robert Childres & Jack Garamella, The Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in
Contract,64 Nw. U. L. REv. 433 (1969). Childres and Garamella seem to think that those who
approve the Boomer v. Muir approach do so only because they believe that the breacher of a
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Critics of the majority rule have argued that one cannot so dispense with the contract, since (it is argued) it is only the contract that
keeps the supplier from being an "officious intermeddler" unable to
recover on a restitutionary basis.15 1 -But that is not so; as we saw earlier, one who accepts goods or services with a knowledge that they are
not a gift, and who has an opportunity to reject them, may be responsible for them in restitution. 52
But all this is somewhat beside the point; as intimated above, the
definition of "benefit" or "enrichment" is a notoriously unstable basis
for argument. It is better to note three things. First, contract doctrine
has historically used the value of plaintiff's goods and services as a
restitutionary measure. 53 Second, the restitutionary principles that
favor avoiding harm to the defendant-such as those principles that
would measure a recovery by the defendant's own experience of benefit-are premised upon a defendant's innocent passivity. 5 4 For example, when a creditor receives two full payments on the same debt, he
contract is a morally "bad man." Id. at 435. However, we do not see that belief as necessary to
our argument. Once a contract is repudiated, quantum meruit seems a fairly neutral fall-back
position. It was even used in a case vhere neither plaintiff nor defendant was at fault in any way.
See the discussion of Vickery v. Ritchie, 88 N.E. 835 (Mass. 1909), supra note 7.
151. See eg., LAYcocK, TEACHERS' GUIDE, supra note 8.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44. Such a principle of "free acceptance" may
however be dangerously broad.
153. Thus, the same casebook that presented a standard definition of restitution-that is,
one focused on the defendant's benefit, see supra text accompanying note 146-also notes that
restitution has a significant overlap with reliance and its focus on the plaintiff's loss. FULLER &
EISENBERO, supra note 146, at 311 (citing Childres & Garamella, supra note 150, at 435-36).
Childres and Garamella argue that recoveries like that awarded in Boomer v. Muir are incorrect
because, inter alia, such fact patterns merely present versions of reliance damages, which should
be dealt with by reference to the contract terms.
154. In perceiving a need to avoid imposing a net harm on defendants in unjust enrichment
cases, courts seem to draw a distinction between persons who have passively come into possession of something belonging to another, and those persons who have taken an active role to
direct the contested benefit by themselves. Cf.supra note 150 (stating that our position is not
dependent on the "bad man" view of contract breach).
An innocently passive defendant who has received the benefit of a stranger's services without request generally will be liable for no more than "the amount by which the recipient or his
property has benefitted." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, QUASI CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 155 cmt. d (1937) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF RESTrrIoN]. Similarly, when
a trespasser adds extraordinary value and has not committed the trespass intentionally, the
owner can claim only the value of the materials taken but is not entitled either to the thing taken
or its increased value. See AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.9 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
Persons who violate the rights of others, particularly if they do so knowingly, may be treated
quite differently. See, e.g., id. § 129(3) cmt. d, illus. 5 (where a trespasser takes shrubs, knowing
they are not his, and doubles their value through his gardening efforts, the plaintiff is entitled to
their value as improved, thus granting plaintiff the advantage of defendant's efforts). Fiduciaries
who violate their trust, for example, may be required to disgorge all profits, including those that
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passively finds himself enriched; a court might be reluctant to force

this overpaid creditor to disgorge the benefit if he would suffer a net
harm by being required to return it. 155 But in our cases, the defendant
has committed a breach of contract; he is not innocent or passive.
And where a defendant is not a passive innocent, the courts will be
less concerned with protecting his autonomy from any possible
harm. 6 Similarly, Professor Birks believes that with "free acceptance," a defendant forfeits his right to complain that the restitutionary
remedy costs him more than his subjective valuation of the benefit
received.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, objections premised upon
the nature of restitution fundamentally mistake the concerns that
uniquely demark that doctrinal area's sphere of dominance. The
proper triggering event for the various doctrines known as restitutionary is the presence of some positive value that defendant has reaped
(or has sought to reap) as a result of plaintiff's efforts. The presence
of such positive effects requires use of a distinct approach, which our
mealaw largely groups under the title restitution. 5 7 However, the
1 58
sure of recovery need not be limited to the triggering event.

result not from the plaintiff's resources but from the fiduciary's own entrepreneurial ability. See
1 GEORGE E, PALMER, THm LAW OF REsTrrUTnON § 2.11 (1978). A trustee may be held
"accountable for the profits made by his employees even though he received none of the profit."
ld.
§ 2.11, at 142.
Sometimes even in the case of passive defendants, the court will impose a recovery in excess
OF REnTToN § 1 cmt. e
of the benefit the defendant had received. See, e.g., ,rAEATEmENT
(1937) (stating that the estate of an accident victim who is assisted skillfully, but fruitlessly, by a
medical professional during an emergency must pay regardless of the fact that the defendant was
not "enriched thereby"); see id. § 155 cmt. d. There is enough flexibility in the term "benefit,"
however, to make any such inquiry ambiguous.
155. Thus, a defendant who receives property by mistake probably need not pay if the property is lost before the mistake is discovered. DAN DOBBS, HoRNOeK ON THE LAW OF REmEDIEs § 4.6, at 280-81 (1973).
156. See Gordon, supra note 26, at 199 n.193.
157. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution and Intellectual
Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 (1992) (exploring the different rules that should apply when
positive as compared with negative externalities are at issue); Donald Wittman, Liability for
Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J.LEGAL STUD. 57 (1984) (same).
158. For a brief discussion of this controversial issue, see Laycock, supra note 123.
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IX. UNJUST ENRICHMENT, DEFAULT RULES, RELIANCE,
AND EXPECTATION: UNITED BUT
DISTINGUISHED THEY STAND
Whether one classifies cases like Boomer v. Muir as restitution, as
reliance, or as expectation, the result should be the same:15 9 In cases
of ostensibly-but-not-truly-losing contracts where the supplier partially performs, a recovery should be appropriately keyed to what the
supplier has provided-rather than to what the defendant has
received or the contract states as its price. We hope we have proved
the substantive appropriateness of our approach. In this section, we
also suggest that our rule can be consistent with the concerns underlying various classifications' approaches, even though those other classifications may be encrusted with subrules that inhibit their reaching a
Muir-type recovery.
A.

OvFmRA,

The majority rule's restitution measure both reflects what the
plaintiff expended in reliance and can indicate that the plaintiff
expected to receive at least that -much in benefit from the contract.
Just as reliance is sometimes said to be the best measure of expectation,16° in some contexts restitution may serve as the best measure of
both reliance and expectation. 61 In part for that very reason, our rule
well represents the most plausible default rule.' 62
159. Thus, for example, Childres and Garamella would classify Boomer v. Muir as a reliance
case, and they criticize its result on that account. Childres & Garamella, supra note 150, at 448.
We think the case is mischaracterized as simply a matter of reliance, since the monies spent by
plaintiff were spent for the benefit of the defendant. Yet even Childres and Garamella, who
would place the case solely within the reliance camp, recognize that the most important issue is
not classification but result. Id. at 438.
160. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26.
161. For further discussion, see supra Part ll.D.
162. We are assuming here an approach to default rules that seeks to emulate what the
parties would have chosen. Cf David Charny, HypotheticalBargains: The Normative Structure
of Contract Interpretation,89 MIc. L. REv. 1815 (1991) (evaluating the approach which asks,
"what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly averted to the issue?"). In some
contexts different approaches to default rules should be used; thus, for example, it is suggested in
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Complete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989), that parties should sometimes be penalized for failing to
fill in their terms-but our case is not one of those where a "penalty" approach should be
employed. As previously explored, we think the cost of the parties' specifying the terms of all
non-price benefits-including the cost inherent in possibly eroding the trust on which necessary
reciprocity may rest-is far higher than the cost of judicial administration to determine these
terms. See supra part VII.D.2. This notion is discussed further infra Part IX.B.
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Thus, if the parties had thought to discuss the issue, the supplier
might have said, "I'll give you goods and services at a below-market
price because I put a value on the contract for reasons [a b c], which
make the contract worth more to me than just the money you'll pay
me under it. If you don't follow through, however, that means I'll lose
[x y z], as well as whatever I've spent or forgone in performing the
contract for you.163 If that happens, at least you should reimburse my
costs. (I'll even concede that if for some reason my costs are higher
than the market value of the goods and services I provided, you
should pay me only the market value.164) This proposal of mine seems
fair, since you're getting such a price break, and since this eventuality
only comes up if you breach, and since even then I'd only be asking
you to pay for what you receive." In all likelihood, the defendant
would agree-after all, he expects to get below-market goods and
services, and at time of inception has no plans to cancel.
B. Is RESTITUTION NECESSARY?
Even someone who agreed with the foregoing might contend that
our rule is unnecessary-that the cases we discuss in this Comment
are those in which the courts would award expectation or reliance
damages, so that restitution would be superfluous. We disagree. The
cases we discuss-of ostensibly but not-truly-losing contracts-are
not insignificant in number and scale, yet they are likely to fall outside
the kind of expectations and reliance that courts traditionally enforce.
Reliance damages in excess of contract price are unlikely to cover
cases such as Muir because such damages are usually awarded when
the plaintiff expended funds outsidehis contract obligationsin reliance
on the future performance of the contract by the defendant. 6 A
large part of the reason for this rule, which prohibits recovery for
"essential" expenditures under a reliance theory, is a fear of double
163. The necessary implication is: I value [x y z] more than I value the difference between
the market price (or my cost) and the contract price.
164. Recall that under our rule, a plaintiff who spends wastefully on partial performance will
not be able to collect full reimbursement for costs: If the defendant can prove those costs were
above the market value of what the plaintiff provided, the court would require the defendant to
pay only market value. See supra part ll.C (our rule); see also suprapart VI.E (discussing remedial measures).
165. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 26, at 78-79 (discussing essential versus incidental reliance). Further, it is doubtful that a supplier's opportunity cost would be compensated for under
a reliance theory. Id. at 82.
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recovery: The plaintiff's costs of contract completion are already calculated into the lost profits the plaintiff can obtain under an "expectation" measure."
In our situation, there is no danger of double
recovery unless expectation damages are significantly broadened, 167
yet the way the reliance formulae are usually stated would make reliance damages diffcput to obtain.' 8
,
Expectation damages are also. unlikely to cover our type of cases,
because non-price benefits are hard to prove under prevailing requirements of foreseeability and certainty. Over the last several years,
American courts have significantly lowered the threshold of proof
required to establish the intangible or future benefits of a contract. 69
In some cases, courts require parties to show the other party's liability
by a preponderance of the evidence but lessened the standard
for establishing the extent of damages. 170 Following this general shift,
courts in various jurisdictions have considered claims for loss of goodwil1,171 damage to reputation, 7 2 lost profits after part performance,173
166.
167.
168.
ures are
169.

See, eg., Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 546 (1903).
See infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
Some courts do, admittedly, give "essential reliance" damages where expectation measunavailable.
FARNswoRTH, supra note 51, § 12.15.

170. See Massman Constr. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 769 F.2d 1114, 1122 (E.D. Tenn.
1985) (citing Locke v. United States, 283 F.2d 521 (Ct. Cl.1955) ("If the reasonable probability
of damage can be clearly established, uncertainty as to the amount will not preclude recovery.")). Professor Farnsworth describes this as the "extreme view." FARNSWORT, supra note
51, § 12.15.
171. See Westric Battery Co. v. Standard Elec. Co., 522 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1975). Some
states categorically deny damages for loss of goodwill. See Argo Welded Prods. v. J.T. Ryerson
Steel & Sons, 528 F. Supp. 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
172. Indiana & Mich. Elec. v. Terre Haute Indus., 507 N.E.2d 588, 606-07 (Ind. Ct. App,
1987) (denying recovery because the quantification of damages was "wholly conjectural" and no
relevant authority supported recovery for "loss of face" due to a breach of contract); see also
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442,1448 (7th Cir. 1992) (allowing recovery for lost
profits on future contracts but denying recovery for damage to reputation); Redgrave v. Boston
Symphony Orchestra, 855 F.2d 888, 893-94 (1st Cir. 1988) (en banc) (denying recovery for damage to reputation for failure to show specific lost opportunities), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1043
(1989).
173., Terre Haute Indus., 507 N.E.2d at 601-02 (allowing recovery of lost profits after an
owner discharged a contractor prior to the completion of their contract). Given sufficient evidence, courts can easily calculate the present value of lost future profits. See Walgreen Co. v.
Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273,274-75 (7th Cir. 1992). Courts have also been willing to
award the value of a "chance." See Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1990); Anderson v. Gailey, 606 P.2d 93 (Idaho 1980) (stating that even though determining
the value of a chance is difficult, "the difficulty of the task does not warrant the abandonment of
the duty"). The value of a chance is the likelihood of the profits occurring multiplied by their
present value.
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lost future profits,174 lost opportunities, 175 and opportunity costs. 176
1
Non-price benefits can include just such factors. "
Nevertheless, despite the loosening of the requirements of fore-

seeability and certainty, in many cases in which parties claim intangible and future benefits flowing from the existence or completion of a
contract, courts still deny recovery. 7 8 An expectation measure of
damages is therefore unlikely to capture many of the Muir-type cases
where non-price benefits are anticipated.
But should expectation damages be broadened to do so? Argua-

bly, some recent cases have awarded damages for what traditionally
would be considered speculative expectations. If this trend continues,
then perhaps plaintiffs in cases such as Muir could be awarded the
equivalent of restitutionary relief under the heading of expectation
damages covering the plaintiffs' non-price benefits.
Assuming one is persuaded of our overall approach, which is the
better remedial form? Maintaining the restitutionary remedies, or
extending expectation remedies to include traditionally restitutionary
remedies and limiting restitution as a contract remedy to the old com17 9
mon law boundaries?
It may be desirable to move restitutionary remedies to rest under

the expectation umbrella in order to streamline and simplify the categories of contract remedies. But, blending expectation damages with
our type of case would arguably overcompensate plaintiffs and
increase administrative costs. A plaintiff like the subcontractor in
Muir should not receive compensation for his non-price expectations
174. Dallman Co. v. Southern Heater Co., 68 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878-81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)
(allowing recovery for projected profits from contracts with third parties).'
175. Air Technology Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 199 N.E.2d 538,548 (Mass. 1962) (allowing
recovery).

176. Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1369-70 (7th Cir.
1985) (denying recovery and noting that the law had not "evolved to the point where every time
a buyer breaks a contract, the seller is entitled to the time value of money").
177. In PaulHardeman, Inc v. Arkansas Power & Light, the plaintiff was a new and growing
business. In their discussion of the bid, a "losing contract" according to their figures, the defendants speculated that perhaps Hardeman had submitted a low bid in order to gain entry into the
power transmission field. 380 F. Supp. 298, 309 (E.D. Ark. 1974). Furthermore, the court notes
that the plaintiff's cost of performance was higher because it was forced to learn on the job. ld.
at 311.
178. See e.g., Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Measure and Elements of Damagesfor Breach
of Contract to Lend Money, 4 A.L.R14th 682, 719-20 (Supp. 1994); supra notes 164-65 and
accompanying text.
179. We assume that Professor Kull will both object to the extension of expectation remedies and advocate the limitation of restitution.
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unless he provided significantly discounted supplies. Such supplies,
whether of goods or services, both demonstrate the existence of
expectations, 180 and, perhaps more importantly, shift the balance of
the equities. Expectations in the absence of benefits transferred to
defendant should be handled under traditional expectation rules, with
their constraints regarding speculativeness and certainty.
Reducing or eliminating the coverage of restitutionary equitable
remedies, further, may blur the flavors of, and differences between,
the remedies. Contract remedies may become more explicitly discretionary 181 and restitutionary remedies may become more limited by
reference to the contract. Whether these changes are desirable is an
important question, which we leave for another day.
X. CONCLUSION
Our departure point, as our starting point, is the issue raised in
the Muir case: Should a supplier of goods and services at below-market price be awarded, upon breach by the other party, restitutionary
relief-actual cost or market price far exceeding the contract price?
No, says Professor Kull. The supplier should receive "what he bargained for"-the contract price. We agree that the supplier should
receive what he bargained for. We disagree that what he bargained
for is the contract price. We do not presume that the supplier is foolish but rather that he provided a discount in order to obtain non-price
benefits from the contract completion, for example, enhanced reputation or reciprocal treatment from the other party. If the other party
agreed to receive the discounted price and had notice of the supplier's
expectations, that party should be permitted to take advantage of the
discount without meeting the expectation if and only if the party performs its part of the bargain. If that party breaches the contract, the
discount-which was premised upon the promise of contract completion-should no longer be available to it. Under the Muir majority
180. The plaintiff has put his money where his mouth is: The plaintiff incurred costs, and in
many cases substantial costs, in exchange for a chance to gain the non-price benefits. Such cases
constitute a sufficiently distinct and narrow group that they would not open the floodgates to
litigation. In addition, the courts' costs of determining the value of the plaintiffs' expectations
are minimized by following the plaintiffs' expenditures. These expenditures are likely to provide
the courts a reliable guide to assess the value of the plaintiffs' expectations. For an alternative
view see Levmore, supranote 92. For these reasons judicial determination of restitutionary remedies involves relatively modest increases in administrative costs, as compared to other remedies, such as expectation and reliance damages.
181. For an introduction to the many ways in which contract damage remedies already
reflect judicial discretion, see Laycock, supra note 123.
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rule, accordingly, the supplier has the option of rescinding the contract and demanding the full market price (or costs) for the goods and
services supplied.
Under traditional contract law plaintiffs such as the subcontractor
in the Muir case cannot claim expectation-based or reliance-based
compensation because their expectations are too speculative. If contract law expands expectation remedies to include non-price benefits
of the kind examined here, then perhaps restitutionary remedies could
be subsumed under that category of remedies. Whether such a move
is desirable is a matter we leave for another day. Until such time,
however, restitutionary remedies should be maintained, or, better yet,
a rule such as ours should be adopted, distinguishing between genuinely losing and ostensibly losing contracts. In both events, plaintiffs
such as the subcontractor in Boomer v. Muir should be compensated
for the non-price benefits that motivated their contractual behavior.

